Affidavit of Attorney Index #125 March 09, 2023 (2024)

Case

Shannon Tyrone Craig, Sr. vs Hennepin Co. Sheriff

Jul 16, 2024 |Closed |Sexual Harassment |Sexual Harassment |27-CV-24-10625

Case

Robert E. Villanueva vs Circle K Stores Inc., Holiday Station Stores, LLC, CORPORATION SERVICE COMPANY

Jul 18, 2024 |Conroy, Lois R. |Personal Injury |Personal Injury |27-CV-24-10809

Case

JACOB JOSEPH SCHMITZ vs Park Nicollet Methodist Hospital and Dr. Thomas Stark

Jul 16, 2024 |Anderson, Jamie L. |Malpractice |Malpractice |27-CV-24-10592

Case

Abhimanyu Roy vs The Regents of the University of Minnesota

Jul 17, 2024 |Janisch, Karen |Personal Injury |Personal Injury |27-CV-24-10690

Case

Robert E. Villanueva vs Frankies Towing, LLC

Jul 18, 2024 |Closed |Personal Injury |Personal Injury |27-CV-24-10810

Case

Marlon Ballard vs Kleen-Tech Services, LLC

Jul 17, 2024 |Magill, Francis J. |Personal Injury |Personal Injury |27-CV-24-10736

Case

Gary John Kislenger vs State Auto Group d/b/a State Auto Insurance Companies n/k/a Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

Jul 18, 2024 |Burke, Susan N. |Personal Injury |Personal Injury |27-CV-24-10787

Case

Pang Lee vs State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Jul 17, 2024 |Wahl, Edward Thomas |Personal Injury |Personal Injury |27-CV-24-10732

Case

Abdishakur Mohammed vs Joseph Theodor Frank Mikalojczyk, Foundation Building Materials, LLC

Jul 18, 2024 |Sande, Christian M |Personal Injury |Personal Injury |27-CV-24-10789

Ruling

HOLLY ROBIN GARCIA VS UNLIMITED RUBBER SUPPLIERS, LLC., ET AL.

Jul 18, 2024 |23PSCV00282

Case Number: 23PSCV00282 Hearing Date: July 18, 2024 Dept: 6 CASE NAME: Holly Robin Garcia v. Unlimited Rubber Supplies, LLC, et al. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys Motion for Leave to Intervene TENTATIVE RULING The Court GRANTS State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys motion for leave to intervene. State Farm shall file an answer in intervention within five days of the Courts ruling on this motion. Otherwise, the motion will be DENIED without prejudice. State Farm is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order. BACKGROUND This is a motor vehicle accident case. On January 30, 2023, plaintiff Holly Robin Garcia (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendants Unlimited Rubber Supplies, LLC, Michael Antonio Diaz (Diaz), Malcolm Defrantz, and Does 1 to 50, alleging causes of action for general negligence and motor vehicle. On June 20, 2024, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company moved for leave to intervene. The motion is unopposed. LEGAL STANDARD An intervention takes place when a nonparty, deemed an intervenor, becomes a party to an action or proceeding between other persons by doing any of the following:& (2) Uniting with a defendant in resisting the claims of a plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (b)(2).) To intervene in an action, [a] nonparty shall petition the court for leave to intervene by noticed motion or ex parte application. (Id., § 387, subd. (c).) A nonparty must be permitted to intervene if either of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) a provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) the person seeking intervention claims an interest related to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that persons ability to protect that interest, unless that persons interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1)(A)-(B).) A court has discretionary authority to allow a nonparty to intervene if the person shas an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both. (Id., § 387, subd. (d)(2).) DISCUSSION Analysis State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) seeks leave to intervene in this action on behalf of Defendant Diaz, its insured who has not appeared or otherwise participated in this action. State Farm contends it is entitled to intervene as Diazs insurer to protect its interests and Diazs interests. State Farm contends it has a property interest in this litigation because it is obligated to pay any judgments obtained against its insureds under Insurance Code section 11580, subdivision (b)(2), and it has the right to intervene when its insureds cannot defend themselves. State Farm contends it is also entitled to permissive intervention because Diaz is now in pro per and cannot or will not assist in his defense, and Diazs failure to comply with prior discovery matters may lead to his answer being stricken or a default being entered. State Farm contends it also has an immediate interest to stand in the shoes of Diaz in defending the present action and the policy State Farm issued. State Farm contends the proposed answer in intervention will assert the same general denial and affirmative defenses as to Diaz and that intervention will not enlarge the issues in this case in any substantive manner. State Farm also contends intervention will not create prejudice to any other party. The Court finds State Farm is entitled to intervention. An insurer's right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damage, arises as a result of Insurance Code section 11580. (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386.) An insurer has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation, because it may be required to satisfy any default judgment entered against its insured. (Id., at p. 387.) State Farm, as Diazs insurer, is therefore entitled to intervene on Diazs behalf since State Farm will be liable for any judgments that may be entered against Diaz. There is also no indication that State Farms intervention would enlarge the issues in this case since State Farm is merely seeking to stand in the shoes of Defendant Diaz who is already a party to this action and therefore potentially liable. The Court further notes that the motion is unopposed, which the Court construes as a tacit admission that the motion is meritorious. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410; C. Opposing the Motionand Rebutting the Opposition, Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 9(I)-C, ¶ 9:105.10.) The Court does note, however, that it is not entirely clear what is the proposed answer for Defendant Diaz, which was supposed to be filed with the moving papers per Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (c). (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (c).) State Farm provided multiple answers to the complaint with its moving papers, and none of them indicate that they are the proposed answer in intervention for Diaz. (See Cullins Decl., ¶¶ 3-5, Exs. B-D.) Notwithstanding, the Court will grant the unopposed motion and require State Farm to file its answer in intervention forthwith. CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companys motion for leave to intervene. State Farm shall file an answer in intervention within five days of the Courts ruling on this motion. State Farm is ordered to give notice of the Courts ruling within five calendar days of this order.

Ruling

STEPHANIE HUGHES VS CULVER SALAR FAMILY INVESTMENT, LLC

Jul 17, 2024 |6/18/2022 |23SMCV01089

Case Number: 23SMCV01089 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: I The demurrer is OVERRULED. While defendants statement of law is correct in that it is hard to see who the individual is that is alleged to be specifically responsible, there is enough here for pleading purposes. The specifics can be fleshed out in discovery and for now there are allegations, albeit general, as to the defendants acting together. In short, these issues are better raised by way of a summary judgment motion or at trial. The court is also having trouble understanding how the demurrer is timely. The court notes three discovery motions on file. That does not bode well this early in the case. The court has not worked up those motions, but for the parties aid, the court appends its guidelines on discovery responses, meet and confers, and IDCs. The court encourages IDCs where both parties would like to resolve the matter informally and in good faith, and often the failure to participate in an IDC can have an impact on the recovery or propriety of any sanctions request. DISCOVERY RELATED GUIDELINES FOR DEPARTMENT I The guidelines below are not rules and they are not universally applicable in all cases. Rather, they are guidelines as to the courts general views. Each case, of course, will be decided on its own facts and circ*mstances, and some of the guidelines below may not apply to particular circ*mstances. That said, the court does take these views seriously. Discovery Responses The Court provides the following guidance concerning its general views on some common issues regarding responses to written objections. The Court has noticed that many attorneys view objections and the manner of making them in a way different than does the Court. To avoid these common pitfalls, the Court offers the following in addition to the provisions of the Litigation Guidelines appended to the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules. First, General Objections are not permitted. The Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for them, and therefore they are disregarded by the Court. Any response that incorporates the General Objections is improper by definition. Second, the Court often views boilerplate objections as being in bad faith. A bad faith response is no response at all in the Courts view. Therefore, making boilerplate objections does not preserve those objections nor does it constitute a good faith response to written discovery. A bad faith response is viewed by the Court for what it is: bad faith. The objections will be stricken and deemed waived. In the context of a Request for Admission, such objections may lead to a finding that the request is deemed admitted, although that will depend on the facts of the particular case and the specific discovery at hand. Objections should be tailored to each specific request. If a request truly is overbroad, then an objection to that effect is proper. But such an objection is best accompanied by some reasonable limitation by the responding party that will narrow the request appropriately and (as narrowed) provide a substantive response rather than a mere statement that the request is overbroad. The same is true as to an objection that a request is unduly burdensome. The Court also notes that the party asserting that a request is unduly burdensome has the obligation at some point to provide an evidentiary basis for the objection, including evidence as to what the burden of compliance would be. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407.) Often such an objection will include a statement by the responding party as to a narrower request that would not be unduly burdensome and provide substantive responses as so limited. Objections that a request is vague and ambiguous must set forth the vague and ambiguous term as well as the responding partys reasonable interpretation of that term as well as a statement that, so interpreted, the response will provide the discovery requested. If there is no reasonable interpretation possible (which is a rare situation), then the responding party must so state. Objections as to privilege must set forth the basis explaining why the information sought is in fact privileged. Where a privilege is asserted in the context of a document request, a privilege log must accompany the answer or be provided within a short and reasonable time after the answer. Where the objection is made in the context of an interrogatory, it must be clear from the objection the scope of the information being withheld. If there is no log, there should be no privilege objection to a document request (meaning that a prophylactic privilege objection is the equivalent of no objection; it preserves nothing). There are some rare exceptions, such as where the entire point of the discovery is to get allegedly privileged information or where compliance would require a log that is in essence an index of counsels file. In that situation, the log is unnecessary, but the assertion should be made that the request is in that rare context. Third, if an objection is made to the discovery but a response is being given, it must be clear whether information or documents are in fact being withheld on the basis of the objections. If the objections are clear and done in the manner set forth above, with statements in the objection as to a narrowing that will make the request proper, this is usually a simple task. The objections themselves state the limit and the response will be full and complete as limited. But where the objections are not so clear, the response must clearly state whether any information or document is being withheld on the basis of the objection and, if so, the extent of the withholding. Accordingly, in those situations, phrases like Notwithstanding and subject to the foregoing objections, responding party states as follows are improper. Those sorts of phrases make the verification useless, as the verifier can always fall back on the objections as the reason why a document was not produced or information was not disclosed. On the other hand, where the line of demarcation is clear, the verification will still serve its purpose. Fourth, for document requests, the substantive response must conform to the Code. There are relatively tight rules as to what the response must say, and the response must say it. For example, where a responding party is not producing documents because they are not in the partys possession, custody, or control, the responding party must verify that a diligent search has been made and must further provide the information set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure in such cases. In the case of interrogatories, the responses must also conform to the Code of Civil Procedure and must be made after diligent inquiry. It is not proper to refuse to respond because the responding party has no personal knowledge. If the knowledge is hearsay, it must still be disclosed, although it can be qualified to make it clear that it is not based on the verifiers personal knowledge. Fifth, the Court frowns on responses that do not conform to the foregoing rules being served with the view that the responses will moot themselves out in the meet and confer process. That is not how the process works. A good faith response is required before the meet and confer process begins. The meet and confer process will (hopefully) bridge the gaps between the parties respective positions. Further, where a response to a request for documents is made and documents are to be produced subject to certain objections (with the documents withheld properly delineated), the documents should be turned over irrespective of the meet and confer. The documents are to be produced with alacrity to the extent that there is no objection to them. What this means is that the response to a discovery request is not a trivial undertaking. Nabbing the response from the form file is a generally bad idea and can lead to all objections being waived. The point is that the boilerplate often renders the remainder of the response useless. The only exception is where it is clear that the substantive response is not in any way limited by the objections. In that case, the objections do no harm, although they also do no good. Meet and Confer The Code of Civil Procedure requires that before a motion to compel further responses or a motion for a protective order is filed, the parties engage in a good faith attempt to resolve their differences. They are to meet and confer for that purpose. Only if that effort fails can a motion be brought. Sadly, many litigants view the meet and confer process as just another procedural hoop through which they must jump in order to bring the motion, similar to the need to include an actual demurrer with the demurrer papers. The Code requires it, so they do it, but no ones heart is really in it. That is not sufficient. Given that, the Court believes it appropriate to set forth how the Court views the meet and confer requirement. Failure to abide by the guidelines below may well justify denial of the motion or a continuance of it to allow the process to take place. If one party but not the other refuses to participate as set forth, more likely than not the party refusing to participate will find itself on the losing end of the motion. The following quotation fairly sums up the Courts own view. [W]e feel compelled to observe that resort to the courts easily could have been avoided here had both parties actually taken to heart Justice Stone's admonitions in Townsend that the statute requires that there be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. (Townsend, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1438.) Perhaps after 11 years it is necessary to remind trial counsel and the bar once again that [a]rgument is not the same as informal negotiation (id at p. 1437); that attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent to persuade the objector of the error of his ways (id. at p. 1435); and that a reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel.... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. (Id. at p. 1439.) (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294, emphasis in original, parallel citations omitted.) In practical terms, it means as follows. It is entirely appropriate to begin the process with a letter or other correspondence. The letter should not include a demand in the form of an ultimatum, but it can certainly include the relief that is being sought with an invitation to meet and confer. It is also entirely appropriate for the other party to respond with a letter or other correspondence to set forth its position on the issues. Such an initial exchange can often be helpful to narrow the dispute. Whether further exchanges make sense will depend on each case and each dispute. However, at some point, before impasse is reached the process must include an actual meet. The letters might well suffice to confer, but an exchange of correspondence is not a meeting. In the COVID-19 era, the meeting can be virtual or telephonic, but a meeting there must be. The meeting must be attended by a person from each side with the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission from anyone, including the client. If only the client can give the needed authority, then the client must be available instantaneously at all times during the meeting. This does not mean that one side or the other must concede, but it does mean that the people meeting have the ability in real and practical terms to strike a deal then and there. The parties should approach the meet and confer process as a problem-solving exercise. The purpose of the meet and confer is not to convince the other side of the bankruptcy of its position; rather the purpose is to reach an agreement by which the party seeking discovery is able to obtain the information that it reasonably needs and the party providing discovery is not put to an undue burden or forced to provide unnecessary information that might infringe on a privacy interest or disclose a competitive trade secret or the like. At the conclusion of the meet and confer, the parties should have an agreed statement as to the outcome. If the outcome is a total impasse, then they should agree on that. If they have resolved some or all of their differences, then they should statein writingwhat that agreement is so that there will be no confusion later. Often, an agreement will be without prejudice to a further request by the propounding party for more information after that party receives the responses. If a motion is still required, the declaration in support should describe with some detail the meet and confer process. While the Court is not interested in the back and forth, the court is interested in when the meeting took place, who was there, and how long it lasted. All communicationsin writing or oralmust be civil, polite, and professional. Name-calling and accusations are devices that undermine the process; they do not further it. A party engaging in such activity generally is not acting in a good faith effort to reach an agreement. Informal Discovery Conferences The court generally will encourage an Informal Discovery Conference (IDC) before any party files a motion to compel further responses. The goal of the IDC is to get to yes. To achieve that goal, the court adopts the following. Five Court days before the IDC, the parties will submit a JOINT statement no more than eight pages total (on pleading paper) setting forth their respective positions. Where a similar issue is raised that will resolve many requests, it can be dealt with as a single issue. The IDC follows the good faith meet and confer. It is not a substitute for the meet and confer. The courts time is to be spent only on issues after the parties have tried to narrow the dispute as much as possible. As stated above, the goal is to get to yes. This means a few things. One is that each party must be represented by a person who has the authority to agree to the other sides position without getting further permission. It need not be lead counsel and that authority need not be exercised. But the people at the conference must have that authority. If only the client has that authority, then the client will be present physically with counsel in an adjacent room without distraction after initial introductions are made. All IDCs are off the record. That means that whatever anyone says at the IDC will not be binding or quoted back at the party unless an agreement is struck. It is very bad form to quote the courts comments at an IDC during a later hearing unless the comments were part of a stipulated order. All parties have the right to change position if no deal is reached. The court, for example, might strongly indicate that it believes one side or the other has the better position but rule in a completely different way if there is a formal motion. Partial agreements that are contingent upon a full resolution are not binding unless a full resolution is reached. Partial resolutions that are not contingent on a full resolution are binding. Parties who are suggesting a resolution should make it clear whether their proposal depends upon other resolutions. Parties should be especially willing to give up sanctions at an IDC if it will resolve the dispute. That is not a requirement, but the courts experience is such that if a party is really going to insist on a sanction, the likelihood of a resolution is very low. It is likely that no party will get everything that it wants. The goal is to abide the Code, but at the same time make sure that the party seeking discovery is not creating busy-work or demanding a lot of work for no benefit (or virtually no benefit). The responding party might well have the right (should it come to motion practice) to avoid some aspect of the discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the responding partys interest to be willing to offer something. Conversely, the propounding party might have the right (should it come to motion practice) to get some aspect of discovery, but in order to get to a resolution it might be in the propounding partys interest to forego aspects of the discovery that are not really needed, perhaps reserving the right to seek that information at a later time should it prove necessary. The point is not to have the Court simply hammer away at the opponent. That might happen at a motion, but it is not the goal of the IDC. No orders will be made except on stipulation. However, if there is an agreement, the court may well want to make an appropriate order or ask the parties to confirm it in writing. Parties should take careful notes on any agreements. Because there are no Court Reporters, it is hard to put an agreement on the record. However, unless the agreement is confirmed quickly, people have a tendency to forget or to have buyers remorse. Therefore, it is best to have one party send an immediate confirming email to the other and obtain an agreement. The court would prefer not to get into the specific wording of the agreement during the IDC unless absolutely necessary. The IDC process does not work if people view it as just a necessary step to filing a motion. The court does not see it that wayif it did, then the court would abandon the IDC as a waste of time. Rather, this is an off-ramp to avoid motion practice and the attendant costs and time. Hopefully, it is also a way to get discovery more quickly than through formal motion practice. At the IDC, no matter how hot tempers have run in the past, the court expects all counsel to be polite and civil in tone to one another. The court will not tolerate rudeness or unnecessary accusations. They do not move the ball forward and they make it nigh impossible to reach an agreement.

Ruling

DANIEL ABRAM VS SOULCYCLE, INC., A CORPORATION, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |22STCV00193

Case Number: 22STCV00193 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: B Daniel abram V. soulcycle inc., et al. MOTION to be relieved as counsel Date of Hearing: July 16, 2024 Trial Date: February 3, 2025 Department: B Case No.: 22STCV00193 Moving Party: Counsel for Plaintiff Responding Party: N/A BACKGROUND This case stems from allegations of negligence after Daniel Abram (Plaintiff) participated in a cycling exercise class. Plaintiff files a Complaint against SoulCycle Inc., SoulCycle Beverly Hills, LLC and Lindsay Warner (Defendants). The motion now before the Court is a Motion to Be Relieved As Counsel filed by counsel for Plaintiff, Chet R. Bhavsar. Tentative Ruling Plaintiffs Counsels Motion to Be Relieved As Counsel is GRANTED. DISCUSSION Legal Standard An application to be relieved as counsel must be made on Judicial Counsel Form MC-051 (Notice of Motion and Motion) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(a)), MC-052 (Declaration) (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(c)). The proposed order must specify all hearing dates scheduled in the action or proceeding, including the date of trial, if known. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) Further, the requisite forms must be served on the client and all other parties who have appeared in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(d).) The court may delay the effective date of the order relieving counsel until proof of service of a copy of the signed order on the client has been filed with the court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1362(e).) A motion to withdraw will not be granted where withdrawal would prejudice the client. (Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994), 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915.) Analysis Plaintiffs counsel has provided the Judicial Counsel Form MC-051 and MC-052. All appropriate notice has been given, including to the client which Plaintiffs counsel confirmed by conversation and by telephone. (See MC-052, §3.) Additionally, Plaintiffs counsel provides all upcoming court dates. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs Counsels Motion to Be Relieved As Counsel is GRANTED, effective upon filing of the proof of service of the Order. Moving party to give notice.

Ruling

RYAN CALDWELL VS VIRGINIA LOUISE BEABOA, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |22STCV39573

Case Number: 22STCV39573 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: July 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22STCV39573 MOTIONS: Motion to be Relieved as Counsel MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ryan Caldwells Counsel OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Plaintiff Ryan Caldwells (Plaintiff) counsel of record, Khashayar Eshraghi (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. Counsel contends relief is necessary because there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. No opposition has been filed for this motion. LEGAL STANDARD To be granted relief as counsel, counsel must comply with California Rules of Court (CRC) 3.1362. Even where grounds for termination exist, attorneys seeking to withdraw must comply with the procedures set forth in California Rule of Professional Conduct (CRPC) 3.700 and are subject to discipline for failure to do so. CRPC 3.700(B) lists various grounds for mandatory withdrawal. An attorney's right to terminate the attorney-client relationship and withdraw from a case is not absolute. (See Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 197; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) The decision whether to grant or deny an application for withdrawal is within the court's discretion, and it does not abuse that discretion by denying the application on the ground that the attorney's withdrawal would work injustice upon a third party. (Hodcarriers, Bldg. and Common Laborers Local Union No. 89 v. Miller (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 391.) The rules have been liberally construed to protect clients. (Vann v. Shilleh, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 192.) An attorney, either with client's consent or court's approval, may withdraw from a case when withdrawal can be accomplished without undue prejudice to client's interests; however, an attorney shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, complying with rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and rules. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2).) A lawyer violates his or her ethical mandate by abandoning a client (Pineda v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 753, 758 759), or by withdrawing at a critical point and thereby prejudicing the clients case. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2); Vann v. Shilleh, supra.) DISCUSSION Counsel has filed forms MC-051 and MC-052 and has lodged with the Court a copy of the proposed order on form MC-053 as required. (Cal Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) Counsel states the instant motion is filed for the following reason: This motion is based upon the grounds that there has been an irremediable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that stands in the way of effective representation. (MC-052.) Counsel has provided information for all future proceedings in this case. Additionally, Counsel has been unable to confirm Plaintiffs address despite mailing the motion papers to Plaintiffs last known address, return receipt requested, calling Plaintiffs last known telephone number or numbers, attempting to contact Plaintiffs emergency contact, conducting a TLO search, and hiring a private investigator. However, the declaration in support states that Plaintiff was served by mail. (MC-052, item 3a(2).) This conflicts with the proof of service filed on July 8, 2024, showing that Plaintiff was served personally. Counsel provides no proof of service by mail. Additionally, the personal proof of service states that Plaintiff was served on July 1, 202410 court days before this hearing. Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 requires written notice of a motion including the date, time and location of the hearing on a motion. A moving partys failure to serve the notice of motion and moving papers on a non-moving party violates the basic principles of procedural due process under the federal and state constitutions notice and an opportunity to be heard.¿ (Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. (1982) 455 U.S. 422, 428 [minimum due process requires notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case]; Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, 612 [due process principles require reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard].) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b), moving papers must be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing. Therefore, because Counsel did not provide the minimum notice period, the motion to be relieved is denied on procedural grounds. Additionally, as stated in the previous minute order, the proposed order does not contain Plaintiffs full zip code. (See Min. Order, 5/29/24.) Counsel must correct the zip code in a subsequent motion. Also, the service indicated in MC-052, item 3 must accurately reflect the type of service in the proof of service. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to relieve counsel. Counsel shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file proofs of service of such.

Ruling

Jul 16, 2024 |23CV02864

23CV02864KELLEY v. R.C. BENSON & SONS INC. (UNOPPOSED) MOTION TO INTERVENE County of Santa Cruz’s motion for leave to intervene is granted. Although the Countyfailed to attach the proposed complaint in intervention as required under Code of Civil Proceduresection 387, subdivision (c), the Court waives that defect. The complaint in intervention shall befiled within 14 days of the hearing.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Ruling

ROCHA, FERNANDO vs TRUJILLO, DIANA LISBETH HERNANDEZ

Jul 18, 2024 |CV-22-002302

CV-22-002302 – ROCHA, FERNANDO vs TRUJILLO, DIANA LISBETH HERNANDEZ – Defendant/Cross Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff Fernando Rocha’s Deposition Answers and Further Deposition; Request for Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $4,755 Against Plaintiff and Counsel of Record – DROPPED.Due to Defendant’s filing of a Notice of Withdrawal of this motion on July 12, 2024, this motion is dropped from the Court calendar.

Ruling

Simarjit Khanna vs. Anuradha Batra

Jul 12, 2024 |C23-02650

C23-02650CASE NAME: SIMARJIT KHANNA VS. ANURADHA BATRA*HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT FILED BY PLAINTIFFSFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*Before the Court is Plaintiffs Samarjit Khanna and Anjuli Khanna Papineau’s Motion to EnforceSettlement Agreement Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6. (“Motion”).Factual BackgroundPlaintiffs filed their initial complaint on October 19, 2023. A First Amended Complaint was filed onOctober 25, 2023. Defendant Anuradha Batra filed her answer to the FAC on January 31, 2024. A FirstAmended Answer was filed on February 8, 2024.The Court held a Case Management Conference on February 20, 2024. The minutes from the CMCindicate that counsel appeared for each party. It then states: “Matter settled,” and notes that theCourt sets a further CMC for status. On March 13, 2024, Plaintiffs’ filed the instant motion to enforce SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: DANIELLE K DOUGLAS HEARING DATE: 07/12/2024the Parties’ purported settlement agreement.Overview of Section 664.6Pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 664.6: If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., §664.6(a).)For purposes of this section, a writing is signed by a party if it is signed by either the party or anattorney who represents the party. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 (b).)California courts have interpreted section 664.6 as creating “a summary, expedited procedure toenforce settlement agreements when certain requirements that decrease the likelihood ofmisunderstandings are met.” (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1429).“A court ruling on a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 must determine whether theparties entered into a valid and binding settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174,1182 numerous citations omitted.) “The court ruling on the motion may consider the parties’declarations and other evidence in deciding what terms the parties agreed to….” (Ibid.) “If the courtdetermines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion andenter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Ibid.)“The statutory language makes clear, however, that a party moving for the entry of judgmentpursuant to a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 need not establish a breach ofcontract to support relief under the statute.” (Hines, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1185.) Instead, theCourt is authorized to “enter a judgment pursuant to the settlement regardless of whether [a party’s]nonperformance of [their] settlement obligations [were] excused.” (Ibid.)AnalysisAs stated by Plaintiff’s own authority, under section 664.6 a “trial court may enforce a settlementagreement made during pending litigation if the parties entered into the agreement [1] orally beforethe court or [2] in writing outside the presence of the court.” (Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003) 104Cal.App.4th 1421, 1424.) Here, neither of those options occurred.For many years, section 664.6, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court, required the signatureof the parties to the agreement – and did not allow for the signature of their attorneys. (See Levy v.Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 578, 585-86.) Section 664.6 was amended, however, effectiveJanuary 1, 2021 to allow for written out of court settlement agreements to be signed by an “attorneywho represents the party.” (W. Bradley Electric, Inc. v. Mitchell Engineering (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: DANIELLE K DOUGLAS HEARING DATE: 07/12/202418 fn. 7; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 (b).)Plaintiffs submit a proposed “Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement” (“Settlement Agreement”)which is signed by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ counsel. (Redner Decl. Ex. D.) Defendant did not sign theSettlement Agreement. (Ibid.) Nor did Defendant’s attorneys. (Ibid.) Defendant’s declaration confirmsthat fact that she never approved “any settlement of this dispute that was limited to the terms setforth in the [Settlement] Agreement.” (Batra Decl. ¶ 3.) As such, the submitted written SettlementAgreement does not comply with the requirements of section 664.6, such that enforcement iswarranted.As for an oral agreement before the Court, Plaintiffs argue that at the February 20 CMC “the parties,through their respective attorneys, represented to the Court that the entire case was settled,” andthat the “terms were stated by Plaintiffs’ attorney, with the concurrence of Defendants’ attorney….”(Motion at 2:24-27.)First, the minutes from the CMC do not indicate that the terms of the purported settlementagreement were stated on the record. The minutes merely note that the “matter settled.” Second,there is no indication that the parties were present during the CMC, nor that they themselvesapproved the terms of the settlement agreement at that time.As noted above, the California Supreme Court has held, “the term ‘parties’ as used in section 664.6(“If parties to pending litigation stipulate … for settlement of the case…”) means the litigantsthemselves and does not include their attorneys of record.” (Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th578, 586.) While section 664.6 was amended to allow for the signature of a party’s attorney on awritten settlement agreement, it did not change the requirement that the parties themselves mustagree to the terms of the settlement agreement if the stipulation to settle the case is made “orallybefore the court.” (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6 (a).) Thus, even if the terms were stated on the record(which the record does not indicate), the fact that the Parties were not present to affirm the terms ofthe settlement precludes enforcement under section 664.6.Plaintiff makes other arguments regarding a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fairdealing, as well as equitable and judicial estoppel. To begin with, such arguments are not properlybefore the Court on a motion to enforce under section 664.6. (See Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood, (1989)217 Cal.App.3d 200, 209 fn. 4: “[A] court’s power to make factual determinations under section 664.6is generally limited to whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement agreement.”)Additionally, Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence that Defendant Batra actually agreedto the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, or that there is even a valid agreement toenforce.Based on the above, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 18 JUDICIAL OFFICER: DANIELLE K DOUGLAS HEARING DATE: 07/12/2024

Ruling

Rocciola VS Asbestos Comnpanies

Jul 18, 2024 |Civil Unlimited (Asbestos Property Damage) |RG20061279

RG20061279: Rocciola VS Asbestos Comnpanies 07/18/2024 Hearing on Motion - Other NOTICE AND APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER ADMITTING ROBERT R. SIMPSON AS COUNSEL PRO HAC VICE; filed by Union Carbide Corporation (Defendant) in Department 18Tentative Ruling - 07/15/2024 Patrick McKinneyThe Motion to Be Admitted Pro Hac Vice filed by Union Carbide Corporation on 06/25/2024 isGranted.Pursuant to Government Code section 70617(e)(2), on or before the anniversary of the date ofthis order Pro Hac Vice Applicant Robert Simpson shall pay a renewal fee of five hundreddollars ($500) for each year that Pro Hac Vice Applicant maintains pro hac vice status in thiscase. The Court hereby sets a compliance hearing for 09/19/2025 at 10:00 AM in Department 18at Rene C. Davidson Courthouse. If the renewal fee has been paid at least 10 calendar daysbefore the hearing, no appearance will be required.CONTESTING TENTATIVE ORDERSNotify the Court and all other parties no later than 4:00 p.m. on the day before the scheduledhearing and identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps:1. Log into eCourt Public Portal - https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov2. Case Search3. Enter the Case Number and select Search4. Select the Case Name5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab6. Select Click to Contest this Ruling7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting8. Select Proceed.

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