World over, differences exist about the impact of military expenditure. While development economists consider excessive military expenditure as wastage, many defence economists have a different view. With the defence versus1 development debate unending, China makes a unique contribution. While China’s defence expenditure is not well known, the hinese experience shows that investments in development do provide an expanded economic base subsequently, which will take care of defence needs. Thus, in the last fifteen years, China’s high economic growth rate also coincided with high military expenditure. China’s experience carries an important lesson, i.e., defence and development cannot be treated differently. Rather, they conjoin in contemporary international relations discourse.
There are embryonic signs that Washington is all set to turn the heat on Myanmar. In a marked departure, UN Security Council unanimously agreed on December 2, 2005 to a US request for a “one-off” briefing by Secretary-General on “the deteriorating situation” in Myanmar. The US request followed Tatmadow’s extension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s (ASSK) house arrest and General Assembly Committee’s recent approval of a resolution condemning human rights in Myanmar. The briefing on Myanmar, given informally by Deputy Secretary General Ibrihim Gambari on December 17, 2005, marked the first time the Security Council had discussed Myanmar at the official level. The US government hailed the UNSC briefing as an important landmark and a significant step forward in the future of Myanmar. The US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, who initiated talks on Myanmar and its inclusion in the Security Council’s agenda, said, “it’s obviously up to the Security Council itself to decide what steps to take next. But it’s certainly the intention of the United States based on this briefing to continue advocating Security Council scrutiny of and action in this area.” Sean McCormack, spokesman for the US State Department, also reiterated that the Security Council talks were essential to political change in Myanmar.
Washington asserts that Myanmar is posing a growing threat to international peace and security citing problems caused by illicit narcotics, human rights abuses, internal repression - destroying villages, targeting minorities, and forcing people to flee the country. US Ambassador John Bolton also cited reports of Myanmar trying to acquire nuclear technology.
The renewed pro-activeness on Myanmar appears to be part of its modified agenda to steer democracy as a best bet to counter terrorism. Washington, after supporting a series of regime changes in the former Soviet Republics in Ukraine, Caucasus and Central Asia, is seeking political change in Asia. In the APEC meeting in Busan recently, President Bush pledged to help restore democracy in Myanmar. Earlier, Condoleezza Rice described the junta as “one of the worst regimes in the world.” In July, Bush signed the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act that banned imports from Myanmar.
What came on the heels of the recent US assertion was the 124-page report by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) revealing shocking scale of the military regime’s ‘brutal and systematic’ abuse of political prisoners. President Bush’s 50-minute meeting with a Shan human rights campaigner, Charm Tong recently, indicated his seriousness on the issue. The military regime continues to hold 1,100 prisoners under detention. The move to new capital Pyinmana is the latest in a series of political manoeuvres. The shift appears to be based on the regime’s fear of a possible US attack from the sea—reinforced since the invasion of Iraq. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is irked by report of extensive forced labour and relocations of over 10,000; and villagers forced to construct camps for army. Myanmar has threatened to opt out of ILO’s membership despite warnings by latter of “far-reaching and extremely serious consequences”.
Campaign to get Myanmar on the UNSC has been underway for some time. Former Czech President Vaclav Havel and Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu in their report Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma has created serious impact. Similarly, the victory of blocking Myanmar from chairing the ASEAN forum too has encouraged the West to push for change. The UN too has been strongly critical about ASSK’s detention. However, some council members do not believe that Myanmar’s situation is posing a threat to international peace and security. Russia and China and even Japan, Algeria and Brazil are not likely to allow the issue to become a UNSC agenda. Despite the ouster of Beijing’s favourite Khin Nuynt, China supports the military regime. Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao said in July 2005, China will not change its Myanmar policy “no matter how the international situation fluctuates”.
The Bush Administration, it seems, wants to ring the alarm bells about Myanmar’s effort to acquire WMD. Myanmar’s enthusiasm for acquiring ballistic missiles and to build a nuclear research facility has been in the news for quite sometime. In 2002 Yangon made announcement to develop a nuclear facility with the assistance of Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry (Minatom). The project, stalled earlier due to financial reasons, seems to have been revived now. Minatom is to construct 10 mega-watt pool-type nuclear research reactors in Kyaukse near Mandalay. However, the IAEA team that visited Myanmar in 2001 doubted the country’s preparedness to maintain safety standards. There were reports suggesting North Korea taking over from Russia as the primary source of Myanmar’s nuclear technology. Moreover, Pakistani nuclear experts have been visiting Myanmar since 2001. A delegation led by Zaifullah visited Pyinmana during this summer. The military regime is also planning to acquire an additional squadron of Russian MiG-25. All these lead to the growing suspicion in the US that Myanmar would become the next “rogue” state.
The Myanmar military government on December 5 reconvened, after a nine month break, the National Convention (NC) to draft a new constitution. The political roadmap announced in August 2003 envisaged a new draft constitution; a national referendum; election for parliamentary representatives; and to form a “genuine and disciplined democratic system”. There had been palpable signs earlier of a determinant and relatively moderate former Prime Minister, Khin Nyunt implementing the 7-Step Roadmap. He bought peace with armed-insurgent groups and built sufficient rapport with ASSK. However, the military regime’s roadmap lacked specific time frame or itinerary; indeed, of important details of “transition process”. The chart (a better word than map) shows the military effectively controlling all the procedures and processes of “democratisation”. Tatmadow wants to exercise complete control over the road, the map or the chart. A law introduced recently severely restricts open debate on the constitution. This law No 5/96 is likely to be enforced against those offering new format. The opposition remains steadfast on restricting Tatmadow’s future role in politics. The current ceasefire with insurgents appears fragile; more so with those outside the legal fold who may seek a greater role and higher protection of rights. These along with power struggle within the regime, which became intense after Khin Nyunt’s departure, could derail the NC process. The lack of credibility of the NC is another issue as the western powers have thrown their weight behind the opposition’s legitimacy. The UN special rapporteur, Sergio Pinheiro, has already stated that ASSK’s continuing detention meant the NC is no longer legitimate. But the regime sees the NC being currently at a delicate political stage and as such feels that the release of ASSK and Tin Oo could disrupt the process. Their release may not come about until the main principles of the constitution are ready and the way is clear for a referendum to seek its popular endorsem*nt. ASSK’s popularity undoubtedly remains intact but some of the pro-democracy groups and ranks within NLD do not seem to be happy with her leadership style.
As national reconciliation falters under the military’s rule, Myanmar has been forced to forgo its turn of chairing the ASEAN in 2006. In fact, the ASEAN is already feeling the heat from the US. The ASEAN members at the 11th Summit (December 12-13 in Kuala Lumpur) have departed from their usual non-interference policy to express frustration over the lack of reforms and urged the Myanmar regime to “expedite” progress towards democracy. Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar bluntly asked the regime to release all political prisoners, while Indonesia’s spokesman Marty Natelegawa said “we wanted to express as strongly as possible our disappointment that the issue has dragged on and that it remained unresolved, which has implications for the credibility of ASEAN.” This does indicate that the ASEAN is now effectively abandoning “constructive engagement,” though engagement is still necessary. The decision to send a mission to Yangon in January led by Syed Hamid to seek the release of ASSK is significant in this context. However, the junta is unlikely to allow the ASEAN mission the opposition leaders and ethnic leaders, which will once again make the exercise futile.
So far, neither the engagement strategy practiced by many Asian countries nor the punitive sanction policy used by US and EU has produced any positive results. A section in the US thinks that sanctions would not work against Myanmar because it is a pre-industrial state and can limp along on its own. There is merit in this argument because the limits and effectiveness of sanctions have been explored, both theoretically and empirically.
An uncomfortable fact is that the Tatmadow cannot be wished away easily. But its rationale to exercise powers—protecting the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—appears to be both an exaggeration and an illusion. There is, however, a growing need to deal with the failure of the West and the ASEAN to break the impasse with Myanmar. The UN along with India, Thailand and China—Myanmar’s principal neighbours, should start a trilateral process under the “1+3 framework” to chart an Action Plan, which could be the starting point for an agreed, workable (not theoretical or dogmatic) approach to breaking the stalemate. After securing the confidence of all the concerned parties and actors, the group could work out procedures and mechanisms to assist the process of national reconciliation and political transition. The group should also provide adequate guarantee for Myanmar’s security. There is a need for coordinated EU, US, Japan and ASEAN approaches by way of economic and other measures in support of the politico-sociological proposals of the 1+3. It would be quite natural to demand that, once the Action Plan is internationally accepted, the West would lift the economic sanctions. Meanwhile, the UN should consider engaging the Tatmadow and its professional military in international peace keeping and peace building missions.
India being Myanmar’s neighbour cannot ignore China’s changing Myanmar policy. Beijing could be making conciliatory gesture towards opposition leader without antagonising the military regime, with the belief that without the NLD’s participation, the process could be long and difficult. India has supported, quietly, the democratic process in many neighbouring countries, including Myanmar. If we are not careful, the democratic agenda supported by India for many years could be usurped by China. It is also in India’s interest that the US does not suddenly foment a major crisis in our strategic neighbourhood.
The inaugural East Asian Summit (EAS), touted as groundbreaking, commenced on December 14 in Kuala Lumpur comprising 16 nations— the 10 ASEAN countries, China, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand with Russian President Vladimir Putin making a special appearance. The EAS Declaration, like many issued before in the region, is wide-ranging: from political and security cooperation, infrastructure development, financial issues, further liberalisation of regional trade and investment, poverty eradication to fighting epidemics. Nonetheless, inter alia, three points need underscoring. One, the EAS is going to be an annual affair confined to ASEAN capitals thus dashing Chinese hopes of hosting the next one; two, it affirms to advance “efforts to realize an East Asian community through the AEAN+3 (A+3) process”; and three, the EAS “should remain open and outward looking with ASEAN as the driving force.” As expected, the EAS will not only promote greater intra-regional economic integration but also address relevant politico-security and social issues. ASEAN obviously tried to balance divergent views of China and Japan on the form, composition, and broad future direction. While accommodating the Chinese view that the A+3 should remain the core, it concurred with the Japanese position that it should be open and inclusive.
No doubt the EAS, representing nearly 50 per cent of the world’s population and over 20 per cent of global trade, is a mega gathering and is a testimony to the rise of Asia and how rapidly the world’s politico-economic equations are shifting. Even as the centre of gravity increasingly moves towards Asia, the 21st century will be dominated by events in terms of new economic dynamism as well as serious threats to global security. No one, however, is sure what the EAS’ future agenda, its priorities, its objectives and its primary concerns are likely to be. Moreover, what additional steps the EAS can take that are not already taken by APEC and the ARF are also unclear.
Conspicuous by its absence is the United States, a dominant power with deep military and economic involvement in this region. In Korea and Vietnam the US fought some of the largest and longest wars in history in order to defend its interests. The US appears to be following a wait and watch policy rather than agree to the conditions put by ASEAN and conscious of the fact that when push comes to shove, it is still America that would determine the region’s economic and security future.
Backdrop
The idea of greater cooperation among Asian countries has been making the rounds for quite some time now. Politically, it was India in 1947 that vociferously advocated the concept to raise the consciousness about Asia and concomitantly forge regional unity and solidarity. With this in mind, Nehru convened the famous Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 and later argued for the creation of an Asian Regional Organisation. India undertook a series of initiatives—a special conference in support of Indonesian independence movement in 1949, starting of the Asian Games in 1951, and the Bandung Conference of Asian and African countries in 1955—precisely because of the above aims. These meetings were also the progenitors of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that took shape in the early 1960s. The Asian Union idea failed to materialise for a variety of reasons, mainly due to the onset of the Cold War and China’s extremist politics that culminated in the war with India.
However, more recently the roots can be traced back to the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad who in the early 1990s proposed the creation of an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG). Japan strongly backed the idea since it was seriously concerned about the economic fortresses that Europe and North America were building through free trade agreements. The EAEG failed to take off because of tenuous economic linkages within the region and because of intense American pressure who felt that Japan was trying to create a ‘yen bloc’ in East Asia. Instead, yet another idea, originally Tokyo’s, in the form of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that was languishing for the lack of adequate political support, was pushed to the forefront with Bill Clinton unexpectedly convening the first informal summit meeting in Seattle in 1993. Despite its modest beginning, APEC became ambitious in the next few years adopting a series of annual declarations (Bogor, Osaka and Manila) with the ostensible objective of ‘regional economic integration,’ and not just the promotion of trade. APEC, however, is no where near achieving any of those grandiose plans it has charted for itself. It soon became apparent that the developed member states, specially the US, was more interested in using APEC to expedite the process bringing the Uruguay Round of GATT to a close than to give tangible concessions to promote economic cooperation. The 1997-98 financial crisis, which considerably weakened ASEAN, and the subsequent events have made APEC more a talk shop than an instrument for economic integration.
Another mechanism also came into being in the aftermath of the financial crisis, was the creation of A+3 with Japan, China and South Korea being the three economic partners. Its main objective was to pre-empt the recurrence of future economic crises and to promote regional economic cooperation. ASEAN has been holding plus three summit meetings since 1998 and India was also made a summit partner in 2002 but not included in the A+3 framework. This is in addition to another existing forum called ASEAN Dialogue Partnership meetings that have been held annually since the mid-1970s in which most of the other countries, including the EU and Canada are represented.
In order to deal with security issues, once again a Japanese idea, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was created in 1994. Through a Concept Paper, the ASEAN in 1995 proposed an ambitious agenda envisaging a three-stage progression: confidence building measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Although some movement was discernible in CBMs, the ARF’s progress has been less than satisfactory. In fact, the ARF was found to be wanting when crises actually arose in East Timor in 1998 and over the North Korean nuclear issue. By keeping out of its ambit issues such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan dispute, at the insistence of China, the ASEAN doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs, and more recently the creation of the Six-Party Talks mechanism for North Korea, the ARF has ensured that it is not going to make any dent in either promoting transparency in security policies or creating predictable patterns of relations as it had set out to do, let alone emerge as an institution for conflict resolution.
The Rationale for EAS
Seen against the above backdrop of numerous regional multilateral mechanisms already in existence, it is but natural that the EAS is viewed with scepticism. It has generated more curiosity than interest. It is but pertinent to ask, ‘what is that the EAS will do that the others have not done.’
The EAS is expected to provide a political impetus and commitment to a process that is already on, i.e., the East Asian countries are feverishly interacting economically with each other like never before. The intra-East Asian trade has reached over 55 per cent from about 40 per cent a decade back, and much of regional direct investments are increasingly inward bound. This is happening despite the absence of a region-wide, overarching organisation and is entirely driven by market conditions. Theoretically, strong political support through an institutionalised structure will boost this process and may even result in regional integration. Such integration is expected to address two issues. One, greater interdependence will be a disincentive for countries to become militarily aggressive, and two, many of the existing security problems are unlikely to flare up into conflicts because of certain common, critical stakes.
Theory, however, does not necessarily translate into reality as there are other considerations influencing a country’s policies. For instance, according to the above logic, China and Japan, with trade over US $200 billion annually and with nearly 70 billion Japanese investments, should have been living far more peacefully. In fact, political problems, accentuated by a lingering historical baggage, have become so acute that they are beginning to affect bilateral economic relations and may seriously undermine the EAS in coming years.
The second objective of the EAS, as envisioned by Malaysia when it volunteered to hold the first summit in the last Vientiane ASEAN summit meet, is to create an East Asian community. Once again, the idea of a community appears far-fetched at present. First, despite repeated attempts (more concertedly by Indonesia in the last two years), the ASEAN countries have been lukewarm to any idea of ASEAN security community or ASEAN cultural community or ASEAN economic community. If ASEAN, a much smaller region with much less serious political problems, is not ready or unwilling to create a sub-regional community even after nearly four decades of existence, serious doubts arise about East Asia emerging as a community. In any case, community has an entirely different connotation. Unlike Europe, which has some common characteristics it is difficult to think of a single trait that can be said to be pan-East Asian. Culturally diverse, economically uneven, geographically vast, with a large number of unresolved problems and suspicions leftover from history, East Asia has many unsettled issues that are obstacles to a community.
There are other issues as well. One, what happens to other existing mechanisms such as A+3, the ARF and APEC, and what would be EAS’ relationship with these configurations? In their characteristic style, ASEAN scholars argue that the EAS will complement, not supplant, APEC, A+3, the ARF, and that it is another spoke in the wheel to build confidence and to construct institutions. Is ASEAN capable of leading one more organisation when it has failed to do so on previous occasions? Probably the biggest challenge is going to be ASEAN’s leadership and its ability to manage intergreat power relations, which is the key element of East Asian regional economic and security architecture. Southeast Asia’s overall strategic and economic significance is on the wane with the focus increasingly shifting to the Northeast Asian region and the Indian Ocean and because of the rise of new power centres such as China and India. US-China relations are not without problems; China-Japan rift is already casting a big shadow over the EAS and a potential rivalry between China and India in East Asia cannot be ruled out. Moreover, it is too early to ignore the US. In the final analysis, countries are most unlikely to sacrifice their national interests for the sake of perceived common good.
Certain right-wing sections in Japan have already expressed serious reservations about the EAS because they feel China would be the dominant player. From a Chinese viewpoint, it is a historic opportunity to re-arrange the East Asian political architecture so that its prominence is appropriately reflected. For ASEAN, it is another attempt to rivet the attention of great powers on Southeast Asia and an opportunity to extract concessions by playing one against the other.
India’s Emerging Role
For India, it is a remarkable turnaround in fortunes. Just a decade back, it was not considered worthy enough to be a member of APEC nor did it figure in the deliberations at the time when the ARF was created. An invitation to India to the EAS now is a recognition of its fast growing economic and political clout. The Look East policy that New Delhi has been pursuing is entering a crucial phase after it helped build multi-faceted relations with ASEAN and other multilateral fora, and strengthen bilateral relations throughout the region encompassing political, defence/strategic and economic aspects. Public pronouncement about an ASEAN-centric policy notwithstanding, it is time for New Delhi to look beyond ASEAN. Similarly, in addition to enhanced economic integration with this dynamic region, New Delhi needs to pay attention to political and security dimensions as well. Beijing (and Malaysia) had been less than enthusiastic for India’s inclusion in the first place and did not want it to be part of the core group. They had to relent under intense pressure from Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. During the November 10-11 preparatory working level meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Japan and China clashed primarily on the question of India’s role and status in the EAS. While China insisted that the EAS framework should be limited to ASEAN plus three, Japan strongly argued that other invitees—India, Australia, and New Zealand—should be included as well, but it primarily pertained to India. It is apparent that China sees India as a competitor not just for investments and markets but also for political and security reasons. A policy centred on multilateralism has its limitations (as we have seen with the NAM). Bilateral relations are crucial and often tend to be more effective. By taking advantage of its growing political and economic significance, India should firm up its ties with the region, especially with Japan and qualitatively improve its relations with countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam. With some diplomatic adroitness, India can achieve this while pursuing improved relations with China.
A series of bomb blasts in Delhi on October 29, 2005, that left 66 dead and 220 injured has, once again, underlined the acute vulnerability of major Indian cities to international terrorism. The blasts in Sarojini Nagar, Paharganj and a Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) bus in Govindpuri were well-orchestrated, nearly simultaneous, and targeted crowed markets and city centres. Though investigations are still on, the arrests made so far and the past trend in terrorism and subversion in Delhi has brought to the fore that the terrorists involved had extensive external linkage to groups based in Pakistan. That raises a question on the Indo-Pakistan peace process and the threat posed by the larger agenda of terrorist groups based in Pakistan.
Terror and Subversion in Delhi
Past trends in terrorist violence suggest that Delhi has always been vulnerable to attacks. According to one estimate, there have been at least 25 cases of bomb blasts in Delhi since 1997.1Earlier, on May 22, 2005, one person was killed and 60 injured in two explosions at two cinema halls in Delhi. In addition, a large number of arrests, encounters and seizures point to the fact that the law enforcement agencies have neutralised numerous attempts by terrorist groups to target cities in the last few years. For example, in 2005 alone, there have been dozens of encounters, seizures and arrests, in and around Delhi, of terrorists belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizbul- Mujahideen (HM), Al Umar, Jaish-e-Mohammed as well as Khalistani groups, particularly the Babbar Khalsa Internatinoal (BKI)—each of which operates from Pakistan.
On January 3, 2005, a BKI terrorist, wanted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for various crimes in the US, was arrested by the Delhi police. On January 16, 2005, a Pakistan-trained terrorist of the HM was arrested from Karol Bagh area. On March 3, 2005, two LeT terrorists were arrested with 10 kg of RDX. On March 5, 2005, three LeT terrorists were killed during an encounter at Kakrola Mor in South-West Delhi. A huge quantity of ammunition, including AK-56 assault rifles and hand grenades were recovered from the encounter site. On April 25, 2005, police killed two LeT terrorist near Pragati Maidan and recovered two kg of RDX, four electronic detonator, AK-56 rifle and two pistols. On May 30, 2005, two BKI terrorists were arrested in connection with the May 22-bomb blast at two cinema halls in Delhi. On June 1, 2005, police seized one kg of RDX, a timer, detonator, a .303 rifle, 20 rounds of ammunition and fake driving licenses from a BKI hideout at Inderpuri area, Delhi. On July 1, 2005, Delhi police arrested four terrorists and recovered four Chinese pistols, its 18 cartridges, 35 cartridges of AK-47 rifle, one hand grenade and Rupees 50,000 fake currency. On June 8, 2005, Jagtar Singh Hawara, ‘operations chief’ of the BKI in India was arrested along with two other accused in the May 22 blasts from the GT Karnal Road in Narela industrial Area of Delhi. On July 14, 2005, two BKI terrorists were arrested by the Delhi police from the Old Delhi railway station in connection with the May 22 blasts. On July 12, 2005, the Delhi police arrested a Pakistan-trained HM terrorist from the New Delhi railway station. On August 23, 2005, Delhi police arrested a senior LeT terrorist from Zakir Nagar in southern part of the city. On October 4, 2005, Police arrested a terrorist of the HM and seized Rupees 10 lakhs from him near the Golcha Cinema in the Daryaganj area of Delhi.
Terror Networks and New Terrorists
Investigations on the October 29, 2005 bomb blasts so far indicate that the serial blasts were engineered by the LeT, though it initially denied its involvement. According to the Delhi police commissioner, a Pakistani national and LeT commander of the Srinagar, Abu Huzefa and J&K militant Abu Al Qama and a small team of seven persons were behind the October 29 blasts.2 Hufeza, in-charge of LeT operations in Srinagar, is a proclaimed offender in the Akshardham Temple attack case of 2002 in Ahmedabad. So far, the Delhi police have made four arrests. Tariq Ahmed Dar was arrested on November 10, and his interrogation led the police to one of the bombers, Mohammad Rafiq Shah and two others, Mohammed Hussain Fazli and Ghulam Mohammed Khan. Interrogation of Dar also revealed that he was the main coordinator and facilitator of the blasts. According to media reports, Rafiq Shah may be the first breed of Kashmiri Indians trained in suicide bombings.3
Though it would be premature, at this juncture, to establish any definite pattern, the arrests made so far indicate some trend about increasing involvement of educated and financially well off persons in terrorist networks. For example, Dar is married and has a 17 month-old daughter, a house in Srinagar and a stable job with a Delhi-based multinational. Dar was arrested when police recovered a grenade and Rupees 8.5 lakhs in Saudi riyals. He had also been involved as an over-ground worker with militants where his job was to motivate and recruit people.4 In addition, a number of overground business entities are reportedly involved in this terror network. According to the Delhi police, a Kashmiri shawl merchant in Delhi, Mohammad Hanif Bhat, is suspected to have drawn maps of the blast sites and possible escape routes for the bombers.5Police suspect that Bhat along with two other men formed a module of the LeT.
Another significant trend thrown up by investigations has been that instead of hawala, the October 29 conspirators also used legal channel to transfer funds. Dar had allegedly used Khan’s bank accounts to receive funds through hawala and other channels.6 In the last three months, Rupees 68 lakh passed through the account, way beyond Khan’s means. Some of the funds reportedly came from a West Asian country.7 This only proves that Pakistan-based terrorist groups have been able to create a support structure among Kashmiri extremists’ sympathisers who provide assistance to hardcore terrorists. In the past, terrorist acts such as the December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament were the handiwork of Pakistani militants who were provided local support by contacts. However, in the 29/10 case, due to the international pressure on Pakistan to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure, a new brand of terrorists were in the frontlines and were provided with logistical support from Pakistan-based groups. In all these cases, large transactions of money were involved and served as the motivating factor for the local support system.
Pakistan-based groups: Pan-Indian Agenda
Attempts by Pakistan-based extremist groups to create terrorist networks in different parts of India is not new. An important strategy has been to provoke communal confrontation and intensify recruitment drive in areas dominated by Muslim population across India. Evidence suggests that these groups have exploited incidents such as the Demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 or the communal riots in Gujarat in 2002. After the Gujarat riots, the LeT has been publicly calling on Indian Muslims to join its jihad.8 Though these Pakistani organisations have not been able to mobilise Indian Muslims on a large scale, they have succeeded in creating a number of support structures with local operators.
The LeT has been on the forefront of such extremist mobilisation. Though the group is proscribed in Pakistan, its overground apparatus, fund-raising activities, recruitment drive and military training of cadres continue to function with impunity. A number of senior leaders associated with this group such as Hafiz Mohammed Saeed continue to operate freely in Pakistan. Jamat-ud-Daawa, the parent organisation of the LeT is actively involved in Pakistan occupied Kashmir in relief efforts in Pakistani Occupied Kashmir.9 A number of reports have pointed out that the group continues to enjoy the protection and patronage of the Pakistani state, especially the ISI.
Even a cursory glance at the activities of the LeT suggests that its goal is not limited to Jammu and Kashmir but aims at the expansion of Islamist extremism in a wide segment across Asia, especially India. On a number of occasions in the past LeT’s Hafiz Mohammad Saeed has declared that Kashmir was the ‘gateway to capture India’ and that it was the aim of the group to campaign for secession of Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) and Junagarh (Gujarat) that have significant Muslim population. With an objective to create a caliphate, the LeT asserts that jihad must continue until Islam, as a way of life, dominates the whole world and Allah’s law is universally enforced. Not surprisingly, some LeT cadres have operated in Iraq and the UK; cells have also been detected in the US. Investigations into the July 2005 bombings in London revealed that terrorists involved in the bombing had visited LeT facilities in Pakistan.
Expansion of extremist Islamist agenda beyond Jammu and Kashmir fits into Pakistan’s larger strategy of destabilising India. No wonder, the Pakistan-based terrorist groups have long characterised the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan as a sell out. In September 2005, the LeT-affliated magazine Ghazwa advocated an escalation of jihad in Jammu and Kashmir.10 If this continues under the full glare of Pakistani authorities, it raises several questions about their intention and the future of the peace process. The critical question in this regard is whether President Musharraf has enough support within the military to act against these groups or whether such activities will continue to be part of Pakistan’s broad orientation towards India? American compulsions have encouraged Pakistan to make a distinction between groups operating in Afghanistan and those active in Jammu and Kashmir and at the same time keep the option of negotiation open. Though India has had some success in pushing Musharraf to contain cross-border terrorism, much remains to be done. The core question, therefore, remains that whether Pakistani state is willing to go further in dismantling terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan. Only a sustained pressure from all sides—India, the international community and the expanding peace constituency within Pakistan—can force the Pakistani state to change its strategic orientation towards India.
As far as India’s preparedness of this kind of threat is concerned, the October 29 blasts as well as the past trends demonstrate the capabilities of terrorist groups to strike hard. Given the spread of their network, technologies and recruits available and their deep links with the Pakistani establishment, such groups would continue to pose a major threat to India’s internal security irrespective of the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan. This emphasises the need to evolve a comprehensive approach to deal with such threats. One of the crucial elements of such an approach should be to understand the dynamics of support network and factors such as ideological motivation, financial inducements and various overground, at times, legal entities that form pars of such network. There is also a need to review the response mechanism of security forces including their skill, attitude, preparedness and coordination with other relevant agencies. The police force in particular needs to undergo significant modernisation if it is to cope with the challenge of local and international terrorism.
References/ End Notes
- 1. Ajai Sahni, “Shadow over the Festival of Lights”, South Asia Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 16, October 31, 2005, at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/ 4_16.htm#assessment1
- 2. Aman Sharma, “Delhi bombers foreign, funds from W Asia: Cops”, at http:// indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=81925
- 3. “Our homegrown suicide bombers”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi: December 11, 2005.
- 4. “Delhi blalsts: Lashkar ‘link’ is MNC executive”, at http://indianexpress.com/ full_story.php?content_id=81874
- 5. “Shawl merchant drew maps for Delhi bombers”, at http:// cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=157521
- 6. http://outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=340184
- 7. Ibid.
- 8. Praveen Swami, “Lashkar fishes in troubled waters”, at http://www.hindu.com/ 2004/06/27/stories/2004062705880100.htm
- 9. Kanchan Lakshman, “Jihad After the Quake”, South Asia Intelligence Review, vol. 4, no. 15, October 24, 2005, at http://www.satp.org;/satporgtp/sair/Archives/ 4_15.htm#assessment1
- 10. “Carnage and Consequences” at http://www.hindu.com/2005/11/01/stories/ 2005110104201000.htm
The thrice postponed Afghan parliamentary and provincial council elections are finally over. But, is the Bonn-mandated political process over? With the US intent on cutting down its troop levels in Afghanistan this year, is the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan also over? It is being said that the Bonn process has concluded with the September 18, 2005 elections. If so, then it is pertinent to examine the end-result of the four-year political process and the recently concluded elections. The three landmark events of the process—adoption of a new Constitution by the Loya Jirga in January 2004, the presidential election in October 2004 and the recently concluded September 18 parliamentary elections—pale into insignificance when compared with the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan. The elections have neatly brought out, and to an extent brought back, a complex mix of actors and forces that have defined the socio-political character of Afghan war for over a quarter of a century. The very fact that 2004-05 has been the worst for Afghanistan in terms of levels of violence, drug production and the Taliban onslaught, makes the whole political process and the ‘war on terror’ questionable. It is in the context of the enormous challenges that lie ahead in post-election Afghanistan that India needs to assess its options.
The 159 Million Dollar Elections
Is post-election Afghanistan any different from the pre-election one? It was a foregone conclusion that the new Afghan Parliament would be a motley mix of Islamists, former mujahideen1, drug barons, former Communists2, technocrats, academics, independents, women and the Taliban. The strange mix of candidates that have sprung up from the elections reflects the diversity of stakeholders in the Afghan polity. The victory of some Taliban candidates and their appointment in the Meshrano Jirga (the 102-member upper house) by President Karzai is a notable development.3
The biggest challenge before Presidnet Karzai and his backers is to secure parliamentary approval for his ministerial appoinments. President Karzai’s position in the domestic political calculus remains as precarious as ever. His government will, in all probability, remain dependent on his relationship with the diverse mujahideen factions that have come to dominate the new Afghan Parliament.4 The possibility of power realignments among the different factions to outmanoeuvre one another will continue to be the defining feature of post-election Afghan politics. The 12-party coalition or the National Understanding Front (the Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli) formerly led by the Tajik leader Muhammad Yunus Qanuni can become a political force for President Karzai to reckon with.5
The results of the elections6 make it amply clear that President Karzai may have to reshuffle his cabinet to accommodate some more mujahideen or factional commanders, or their proxy candidates, particularly from among the former Northern Alliance (NA). In effect, the technocrats and the independents in the current cabinet may be increasingly replaced by candidates representing the competing interests of various mujahideen factions. President Karzai’s inability to appoint a new interior minister since Ahmed Ali Jalali resigned on September 27, 2005 underlines his difficulties. He is all too aware of the fact that without cutting deals with the various Afghan factions, it would not be possible for Kabul to have even a minimal presence in the provinces. It is difficult to say to what extent Karzai’s attempt to drive divisions in the loosely knit NA, and to turn their inter-factional and intra-faction divides to his advantage in the run-up to the presidential election, has met with success.
However, President Karzai has definitely emerged as a rallying figure in the US and the UN-backed political structure in Kabul, both for the international community and the mujahideen leaders and commanders. It appears that President Karzai and the mujahideen will continue to remain in an inter-dependence mode for times to come. President Karzai will have to continue with his balancing act between the aspirations of the mujahideen and the Islamists on the one hand, and the urgent need to carry out the reforms process on the other.7 But do the Afghan people have the patience for it keeping in view the high level of corruption among the government officials and the slow pace of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts? The overall electoral process has undoubtedly thrown up new actors in the political set-up in Kabul, who are highly qualified West-oriented professionals and technocrats with no militia behind them. The constant friction between the conservative older mujahideen leadership and the reform-minded pro-West members in the government will continue to test President Karzai’s leadership as before. Therefore, the challenges ahead for Hamid Karzai, whose leadership itself is unique and unconventional in the Afghan context, will not be any different in postelection Afghanistan.
Bonn Process: Concluded or Failed?
The international focus on Afghanistan receded as the Iraq War unfolded. The basic objective of institution-building tapered off as the Bonn process itself failed to institutionalise. The fundamental spirit of the Bonn process was lost as all efforts were diverted towards securing Hamid Karzai’s position in Afghan politics prior to the US presidential elections, and in holding together diverse constituents of the provisional government led by him. As a result, Karzai did emerge as a central figure in the internationally-backed Bonn process, but it also led to the reestablishment and reemergence of the mujahideen leadership who have since been a hindrance to the process of reforms and institution-building.
The US failed to reconcile its interests in Afghanistan and the region with the objectives of the Bonn Agreement.8 Its continued dependence on the militia provided by various mujahideen factions, since the beginning of the Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, was bound to legitimise an overarching role for the mujahideen leadership in the Bonn process. The reworking of the US-mujahideen nexus to oust their common foe, the Taliban, made the Bonn process more of a US agenda than an Afghan one. All through the four years, mujahideen leaders and commanders have been resisting the idea of disarmament and demobilisation of their private armies. They have also been resisting the idea of anti-narcotics operations as they finance their militias through drug money. Simply put, they are against any idea which would lead to the dilution of their power. With the Afghan national army and police beset with many problems, President Karzai’s authority remains limited and dependent on foreign troops and the cooperation of the mujahideen factions.
The policy objective of the US on counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and political stability in Afghanistan has been an apparent failure. The fact that the Taliban and its allies are far from decimation; that much of the country is still controlled by extra-constitutional authorities; that the levels of violence and casualty have been the highest this year; and that Afghanistan remains the world’s largest illicit opium-poppy producer9 bear testimony to the failure of the ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan. Ironically, despite all the dismal facts and statistics, the US role remains indispensable. The US policy towards the Taliban, which has been a mix of outright military action and reconciliation, has a strong bearing on the future of Afghanistan.
The Bonn process may have thus far failed in terms of institutionbuilding and reforms, but the significant role it played in providing a certain framework to the post-9/11 political process in Afghanistan cannot be missed. Compared to previous agreements and accords, the Bonn Agreement was able to ensure the involvement of the UN and the international community in re-building Afghanistan. But the key question, however, remains. What after the elections? What after the Bonn process? With no qualitative change in the situation in the last four years, and with US intent on lowering its presence in Afghanistan, there is a growing skepticism about the future of Afghanistan.
Keeping in view the necessity to build institutions of governance and to carry out reforms, it is imperative to devise a long-term plan under the aegis of the UN for the post-election Afghanistan. The peace and reconstruction process in Afghanistan needs continuity otherwise whatever little has been achieved in the last four years will be conclusively undone. It will be prudent for the international community and the US to realise the folly of re-abandoning Afghanistan.
Assessing India’s Constraints and Options
The challenges and constraints to India’s Afghan policy are immense. The strong element of unpredictability and uncertainty in Afghan politics calls for constant evaluation of India’s options in Afghanistan. The growing Indo-Afghan ties are commensurate with India’s geoeconomic interests both within and beyond the Indian Subcontinent. The perfectly timed visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Kabul on August 28-29, 2005, just three weeks before the crucial September 18 elections, and the areas of cooperation identified between the two countries, makes it amply clear that India is looking for a tangible and a long-term engagement in Afghanistan.
In fact, India’s engagement in Afghanistan has come a long way since the closure of its embassy in Kabul in September 1996 to the August 2005 visit of the Indian Prime Minister, the first in 29 years. Since the January 2002 Tokyo Conference for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India has committed an assistance of $550 million. India has been involved in training programmes and in humanitarian and infrastructure development projects in Afghanistan. India’s contribution in the training of Afghan diplomats, judges, police officers, doctors; developing Afghanistan’s civil aviation and transport sectors; construction of roads, dams, hospitals, educational institutions; and in establishing telecom and power transmission lines is a widely acclaimed fact.
Apart from the political uncertainty in Afghanistan and India’s own resource-limitations, the Indo-Afghan relationship is constrained by its geography and the Pakistan factor. Though India is among the leading donors to Afghanistan, clearly the largest in the region, the Indo-Afghan relationship is yet to realise its full potential. The fact that India does not have borders contiguous with Afghanistan puts India into a dependency mode. Pakistan’s refusal to provide overland transit facilities for Indian goods bound for Afghanistan and further to Iran and the Central Asian markets has led to India taking a longer and a circuitous sea route via Iran. Ironically, Pakistan allows Afghanistan to transport its goods bound for India. The delicate nature of the ongoing political process in Afghanistan and the fractious nature of Afghan polity, coupled with Pakistan’s intransigence in facilitating Indo-Afghan trade, are likely to test the resilience of Indo-Afghan ties.
The current challenge before India, given the above constraints, is how to sustain the growing momentum of its relationship with Afghanistan. Some of the viable options before India are:
- India needs to consolidate and build up on its four years of achievements in Afghanistan by not letting Manmohan Singh’s recent visit become a touch-and-go affair. If India is to reach out to Central Asia and the Gulf region, Indo-Afghan ties have to be high in the order of priority. India should not loose sight of the geostrategic significance of Afghanistan as its growing political and economic interests lie both within the subcontinent and the regions beyond.
- India should further broad-base its engagement in Afghanistan by promoting greater institutional cooperation between the two countries. Identifying new areas of cooperation and opening new vistas of joint ventures will have to be a continuing process. India needs to engage diverse groups within the civil society in Afghanistan, such as, political parties, intellectuals, NGOs, educational and research institutions, media groups, cultural organisations, businessmen and so on. Given the shared past and civilizational ties between the two countries, the idea of establishing an Indian Cultural Centre in Afghanistan and vice-versa can go a long way in reinvigorating the two countries’ relationship.
- With Afghanistan now having a newly elected parliament, regular interaction between the parliamentarians can go a long way strengthening the relations between the two governments. India can take the initiative by sending a parliamentary delegation to Kabul to interact with the newly elected Afghan parliamentarians and to subsequently invite them to India.
- Both bilateral and multilateral approaches are important in India’s contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
- Given the uncertainties of Indo-Pak ties, India needs to strengthen the infrastructure which facilitates its trade with Afghanistan via Iran. The construction of Zaranj-Delaram road is a crucial step in the same direction. It will be prudent if alternate routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia, particularly via Iran, are developed and strengthened. Indo-Iranian ties are vital to facilitating trade not only with Afghanistan but also with the Gulf region and Central Asia. India should continue to explore ways of overcoming its geographical limitations by circumventing Pakistan.
- India needs to build bridges with all the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. India should balance its relationship with both the Pashtuns and the minority ethnic groups. The idea of engaging anti-India politico-military formations in Afghanistan should not be considered as untenable in the changed and changing scenario in Afghanistan.
- As Indo-Pak relationship impinges on the relations and the interests of all the three countries—India, Pakistan and Afghanistan—and the regions beyond, viable scope for cooperation between the three countries may be explored. To promote a strong sense of economic cooperation in the region, the political and economic interests of the respective countries will have to be accommodated.
President Karzai had categorically stated during Manmohan Singh’s visit that peace between India and Pakistan is vital for regional security and economic cooperation. During the joint news conference, President Karzai had emphasised, “Afghanistan is very happy to see a dialogue for better relations between India and Pakistan. Afghanistan is directly affected by friendship between the two countries. The improvement of relations between India and Pakistan are such a necessity for the people of this whole region that overtakes every other consideration”.10 Aware of the fact that Pakistan’s cooperation is imperative for any regional effort to root out terrorism, Karzai further remarked that, “India, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to join hands to fight this global menace”.11
However, given Pakistan’s internal political dynamics, it is unlikely that it will or will be able to completely renounce its support for the Taliban and other extremist forces in Afghanistan. Despite the US pressure, Pakistan has not yet given up its policy of exporting, promoting and supporting terrorism in order to further its political agenda against both its eastern and western neighbours. The Taliban rule and events of 9/11 have made it clear that a stable, democratic and prosperous Afghanistan is not only in the interest of India, but also crucial for regional and international security.
India as the world’s largest democracy is playing an important role in supporting democracy, institution-building and in consolidating the achievements of the four-year Bonn process in Afghanistan. In South Asia, India is the only credible country which is in a position to rollback terrorism and religious extremism epitomised by the Taliban movement, in cooperation with the international community. In fact, India’s role in the economic revival of Afghanistan and in promoting regional economic cooperation is an essential prerequisite.
However, much also depends on the US’ future policy in Afghanistan. The inability of the US to address the paradoxes of its ‘war on terror’ has thus far left the political climate in Afghanistan more uncertain and fluid. The persistent divide between the US’ regional agenda and the interest of Afghanistan does not bode well for the latter. US withdrawal from Afghanistan would inevitably lead to a full comeback of those very forces against whom it had resolved to wage war after 9/11. In that sense, the consequences of re-abandoning Afghanistan at this critical juncture will be disastrous. As for India, it will have to wade through the complex maze of Afghan and subcontinental politics, enmeshed with the interests of extraregional powers and actors, to pursue its expanding economic and political interests. For now, growing Indo-Afghan relationship is a reality.
References/End Notes
- 1. Often referred to as ‘warlords’ or ‘regional strongmen’.
- 2. Former communist General Noor-ul-haq Alomi from Kandahar; former interior minister in the Soviet -backed communist government in the 1980s, Syed Muhammad Gulabzoi from Khost; former deputy minister, Babrak Shinwari from Nangarhar; former advisor to President Najibullah, Kabir Ranjbar from Kabul are among the important former communists who won the elections.
- 3. The notable among the former members of the Taliban who won seats in the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house) are ex-commander Haji Mullah Abdul Salaam Rocketi from Zabul, ex-provincial governor Mawlavi Mohammad Islam Mohammadi from Samangan and a senior former security official Hanif Shah Al-Hussein from Khost. As for the Meshrano Jirga (the upper house), Arsala Rahmani, the deputy minister for religious affairs in the former Taliban Government from Paktiya Province, is among the 34 members recently appointed by President Karzai. Other important appointees to the Meshrano Jirga are the former defence minister and leader of the Tajik militia, Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim from Panjshir; Sebghatullah Mojadeddi from Kabul; and Sher Muhammad Akhund, the governor of Helmand Province.
- 4. The notable among the former mujahideen leaders and commanders elected to the Wolesi Jirga are Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf of Ittehad-e-Islami (renamed as Tanzime Dawat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan), Haji Mohammad Mohaqqiq and Mohammad Yonus Qanuni from Kabul; Padshah Khan Zadran from Paktiya; Haji Hazarat Ali from Nangarhar; Pir Sayed Ishaq Gailani of Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-ye Afghanistan from Paktika; and Burhan-ud Din Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami from Badakhshan.
- 5. Muhammad Yunus Qanuni has stepped down as the leader of the National Understanding Front or Jabha-ye Tafahom-e Melli after being elected as the Chairman of the Wolesi Jirga or the lower house of the Afghan national assembly on December 21, 2005. Former Afghan president and Jamiat-e-Islami leader Burhan-ud Din Rabbani, who withdrew his candidacy for the chairmanship of the Wolesi Jirga in favour of Qanuni, is likely to be the new opposition leader. See “Qanuni Steps Down From Opposition Leadship” at http://www.azadiradio.org/ en/news/2005/12/13385C33-584A-4E7F-93B7-2DE69EB99647.ASP
- 6. The complete details of the election process and the final certified results of the elections to the Wolesi Jirga (the Lower House), the Provisional Councils and the Meshrano Jirga (the Upper House) are available at http://www.jemb.org/
- 7. Also see Vishal Chandra, “Warlords and Karzai’s Balancing Act”, Strategic Analysis, 29(1), January-March 2005. pp. 155-161.
- 8. The Bonn Agreement, formally known as Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, was signed on December 5, 2001. The four Afghan groups invited to the Bonn Conference (Nov 27-Dec 05, 2001) were – Peshawar Group, the Northern Alliance, Rome Group and the Cyprus Group, each representing varying background and political interests. The text of the Agreement is available at http:// www. u n a m a - a f g . o r g / d o c s / _ n o n U N % 2 0 D o c s / _ I n t e r n a t i o n - Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn.htm. Also at http://www.uno.de/frieden/ afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm
- 9. For further details see Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes and the Counter Narcotics Directorate of the Government of Afghanistan in November 2004, at http://www.unodc.org/ pdf/afg/afghanistan_opium_survey_2004.pdf
- 10. Yousuf Azimy, “Karzai Says Better India-Pakistani Ties Vital”, at http:// www.swissinfo.org/sen/swissinfo.html?siteSect=143&sid= 6042952&cKey= 1125227124000.
- 11. Makia Monir and Zubair Babakarkhail, “New Delhi Assures Kabul of All-Out Support Against Terrorism”, at http://www.pajhwok.com/en/news/ viewStory.asp?lng=eng&id=6553
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Moscow from December 4-6, 2005 highlights the continued importance of Indo-Russian cooperation in a changing geopolitical scenario. Beginning with President Vladimir Putin’s first visit to India in October 2000, bilateral summits between the Indian Prime Minister and the Russian President, alternatively in each other’s capital, have become an annual feature. In contrast, President Putin’s predecessor, President Boris Yeltsin visited India only once, in January 1993. Undoubtedly, the coming to power of President Putin has reinvigorated India-Russia ties. Given the current geostrategic imperatives, Russia needs to actively involve India in Eurasia as much as India needs to ensure that the Eurasian political space is filled up by friendly powers. At the same time, both India and Russia realise the importance of extensively engaging all other major and regional players.
In a changing world kaleidoscope, the geopolitical interests of India and Russia tend to converge rather than clash with each other. In a statement to the press at the conclusion of his visit, Dr Manmohan Singh spoke of the need “to anticipate what measures we need to take to meet new and emerging opportunities for further strengthening of our strategic partnership, in meeting our respective national priorities as well as in pooling our efforts in sharing global responsibilities”.
Dr Manmohan Singh gave the assurance of India’s support for Russia’s accession to WTO (World Trade Organisation) and emphasised that the bilateral Accession Agreement shall be concluded at the earliest. President Putin responded by stating that “Russia welcomes the fact that India has the status of observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. We intend to work closely with our Indian partners in the multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.” Russia has also been persistently pushing tripartite interaction among the three largest states of the continent: Russia, India and China. Consequently, a mechanism of regular interaction among the foreign ministers of the three countries during the UN General Assembly sessions in September of each year has been established. The three foreign ministers additionally met at Vladivostok in June 2005 and are slated to meet in New Delhi in 2006. On the issues of combating international terrorism, religious extremism and drugs and arms trafficking, India and Russia have similar interests and have been cooperating with each other. The two leaders also discussed the Iranian nuclear programme currently and expressed the hope that the issue would be resolved at the level of IAEA.
Bilateral Indo-Russian cooperation has traditionally covered a wide spectrum of areas. Summit meetings provide new impulse and momentum to the existing ties as well as an opportunity to revisit and rediscover the potential for furthering mutually beneficial cooperation. In preparation for the Prime Minister’s visit, discussions on the India-Russia Joint Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation and the Joint commission on Military Technical cooperation had already taken place.
Military-Technical Cooperation: Collaboration in Design, Development and Production of Next Generation Weapons
The two countries are signatories to the long-term military and technical cooperation agreement up to 2010. India is a major buyer of Russian military equipment. According to the Russian paper Kommersant, India accounts for some 40 per cent of Russian arms exports and the total value of military contracts with Russia under the present military-technical cooperation agreement is nearly $ 10 billion.1 During his visit to Moscow in mid-November, 2005, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee indicated the possibility of further renewal of the long-term military-technical programme with Russia after the expiry of the current 10-year programme in 2010.2 In recent years India-Russia military-technical cooperation is changing from the earlier buyer-seller relationship to joint research and development of high-tech weapons. Joint development of Brahmos antiship cruise missile is an example of jointly developed technologies. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that during the visit a “comprehensive review” was undertaken of the long-standing India-Russia military technical cooperation and reiterated, “Our perspective, however, is to move towards collaborative projects involving design, development and production of the next generation military products”. During the Prime Minister’s visit, it was announced that India and Russia will collaborate in the development and production of the fifth generation fighter aircraft as well as multi-role transport aircraft. The signing of the IPR (Intellectual Property Right) agreement appears to have finally cleared the stage for the launching of the projects now.
For the past couple of years, Russia had been insisting on the signing of IPR agreement before further cooperation involving technologies. The agreement on mutual protection of intellectual property rights in bilateral military-technical cooperation was eventually signed during this visit. By signing the accord, India has calmed Russian apprehensions regarding their technology falling in the hands of third parties. This comes at a time when India is actively seeking to diversify and broaden its defence supplies as well as Russian fears of the technology being duplicated in the local markets. In keeping with the Indian position, the accord will apply only to new deals and will not have any retrospective effect.3
Among the planned acquisitions, two are important—the purchase of an aircraft carrier and the lease of two nuclear powered submarines. On January 20, 2004 after years of negotiations and hard bargaining it was finally announced that India would purchase the retrofitted Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. The Indian media subsequently published the story that the “bonus” offered with the Gorshkov deal was one of long lease of two nuclear-powered project 971 Shchuka-B class nuclear submarines to Indian Navy, from which Russia subsequently backed out so as not to displease the US.4 Although the officials of the two countries are naturally silent on the issue, commenting on the Prime Minister’s visit, Vladimir Radyuhin wrote in The Hindu (December 7, 2005) that the Russian sources have indicated the lease of nuclear-propelled submarines to India is also in the pipeline. Under a $ 1.8 billion contract for a ten year lease, the Russian side has resumed the construction of the subs, which was frozen in the 1990s. In October this year 200 Indian naval officers have started training at a submarine training centre at Sosnovij Bor near St Petersburg.
Vladimir Radyuhin also reported that India-Russia defence cooperation would acquire a new dimension with the joint use of the Aini air base north of capital Dushanbe in Tajikistan. The Aini base was repaired and modernized by India during the Afghan civil war between the Taliban forces and the Northern Alliance. It has been reported that Russian combat aircraft and helicopters shall be stationed at the Aini air base. It is not yet clear whether Indian Air Force too will have a presence.
Nuclear Energy Issue: Russia Maintains Ranks with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
In keeping with the Soviet-era agreement, Russia is building two 1000 MW reactors at Kudankulam nuclear power plant in Tamil Nadu. The Kudankulam power station will be commissioned in 2007-08. There have been reports of the likelihood of Russia building more reactors for Kudankulam as well as other projects. However, in view of restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, there has been little progress in this field. It is hoped that the July 18, 2005 Indo-US nuclear agreement, when implemented, will remove restrictions on India’s wider cooperation with other countries. The Indo-Russia cooperation on peaceful use of nuclear energy will get a boost. In fact, India has been urging Russia to take the initiative in persuading the NSG to remove the restrictions. Russia, having acknowledged the July 18 Indo-US agreement on civilian nuclear energy,5 has in turn told India to take up the matter with the US first.6
In 2001, Russia had supplied 50 tonnes of low-enriched uranium for the Tarapur nuclear power plant. On the eve of his departure for Moscow, Dr Manmohan Singh, in keeping with the spirit of the Indo-US July 18 agreement, had sought to de-link the issue of the supply of low-enriched uranium for Tarapur power plant from the larger issue of NSG removing restrictions. However, Moscow has refused to supply more uranium for Tarapur plant citing NSG rules. Russia appears to be unwilling to break ranks with other members of the NSG on the nuclear issue this time. Speaking to the press on December 6, 2005, President Putin made it clear that further cooperation between India and Russia depended on the former’s agreement with the NSG and the separation of its military and civilian nuclear programmes as stipulated in the July 18 India-US declaration.
Cooperation in Hydrocarbon Energy Sector
India’s quest for energy security has provided an added impetus to its ties with Russia – the world’s second largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons. It seems Russia, on its part, would like to invite several countries—including Japan, India, China and South Korea—to develop its vast oil and gas reserves in Siberia and the Far East that require billions of dollars of investments and new technologies. Russia would like to maintain a geo-political balance while inviting prospective partners for the development of hydrocarbon resources rather than depend on any single partner, particularly from its immediate neighbourhood. As regards Indian energy interests in Russia, one of India’s largest overseas investments is a 20 per cent share in Sakhalin-I oil project, which has already come on stream. There are reports of likely Indian investment in Sakhalin–III project as well as other East Siberian oil and gas projects. ONGC and its subsidiary Oil Videsh Ltd (OVL) have ties with major Russian oil and gas companies like Rosneft, Gazprom and LUKoil. On its part, Gazprom has a contract for developing gas-bearing offshore block in the Bay of Bengal on a production sharing basis. Indian and Russian research institutions are also cooperating in the study of gas hydrates and other technology related issues in the energy sector.
Cooperation in Space
During the visit an Agreement was signed between the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) on cooperation on the Coronas-Photon project in the area of solar physics and solar-terrestrial relations. This, to recall, was a Soviet-era project, which had been frozen owing to the lack of funds on the Russian side. Apparently, the two countries have decided to resume the joint research.7
Another Agreement signed between the Russian Federation and India was on measures to protect technology during long-term cooperation in joint development, operation and use of the GLONASS global navigation system for peaceful purposes.8 During President Putin’s visit to India in December 2004, an agreement was signed between Roskosmos and ISRO on the joint use of Soviet-era Global Navigational Satellite System (GLONASS) by making it fully functional by joint efforts, including the launching of new Russian satellites from Indian launch pads with the help of Indian vehicles. In February 2005, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs ratified GLONASS. The deal entailed India to reduce its dependence on the US GPS (Global Positioning System.9 In his commentary on the agreements signed during Prime Minister’s December visit, Vladimir Radyuhin has remarked that Russia’s GLONASS system shall be used by both the countries for civil and military purposes.10
Lagging Trade and Economic Ties
India-Russia trade and economic ties are the weakest link in otherwise strong relations. Their bilateral trade of just $1.9 billion does not correspond to the size of the economies of the two countries. Not surprisingly, considerable importance was given to reinvigorating economic ties. A 15- member business delegation led by CII (Confederation of Indian Industries) and FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) accompanied the Prime Minister and Dr Manmohan Singh addressed an Indo-Russian business meet on December 5. Following the Soviet disintegration, systemic upheaval and economic dislocation in Russia resulted in the disruption of established patterns of economic relations. During this period, India was also preoccupied with its economic reforms. Consequently, the trade between the two sharply declined. However, the economies of the two countries are now registering on an average 7 per cent GDP growth annually. The earlier rupee-rouble trade arrangement is now being replaced by market mechanisms. Indian export basket comprising traditional items can be diversified and expanded to reflect the new strengths of Indian economy. With the rise in oil prices, Russia currently is flush with petro-dollars that may be invested in productive sectors. The two sides are also in the process of finalising an agreement whereby the remaining rupee debt funds may be turned into Russian investment in India. It is hoped that the growth in the two economies would provide a stimulus to the expansion of business ties. As the Prime Minister said in the meeting with the press on December 6, the two sides have decided to set up a Joint Study Group to examine the feasibility of a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries.
References
- 1. RIA Novosti, November 18, 2005.
- 2. The Hindu, November 18, 2005.
- 3. The Hindu, April 27, 2005.
- 4. Hindustan Times, December 8, 2008.
- 5. “Russia endorses nuclear pact between US and India” at http://www.indiadefence. com/reports/368, September 16, 2005.
- 6. Dadan Upadhyay in Indian Express, October 24, 2005.
- 7. The Hindu, December 7, 2005. The Hindu, December 7, 2005.
- 8. www.kremlin.ru, December 6, 2005.
- 9. “India and Russia set to boost space cooperation” at www.indiainfo.com, May 13, 2005.
- 10. The Hindu, no. 7.
Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (Penguin Books, New York, 2005), pp. 386.
Deepak Lal, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004), pp. 270.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Super Power Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 2002), pp. 222.
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton University Press, Princeton N. J., 2001), pp. 293.
I – Imperial Power as a Problem Statement
The term ‘Empire’ and its conceptualisation thereof have been debated by scholars for long. The debate continues till date and is likely to be so in the foreseeable future, till at least a satisfactory explanation emanates from it. While the Marxist-Leninist school of thought, contextualising it under various stages of evolution of society, explains it as the highest form of capitalism, eventually leading to the withering away of the state system and bringing in a classless society, liberals and others have found it difficult to explain the broad contours of imperialism. In the absence of a generally agreed definition, contemporary scholarship, especially in the West, tends to explain the term by taking into account relative economic, political and military capabilities of a particular state vis-à-vis others. Inherent ambiguities in such efforts invariably lead to coinage of many other terms like ‘superpower’, ‘hyperpower’, ‘hegemon’, ‘colossus’, or ‘primacy’. Problems in definitions and approximate calculus of power notwithstanding, contemporary scholarship in the West has been pondering over the nature and direction of American power and its implications for the rest of the world.
With the end of the Cold War, the US established its global supremacy. Although military efforts by states around the world, including the US, witnessed drastic reductions in practically every sector of activity, the overall outcome has resulted in the growing power gap between the only superpower and the rest. On the eve of the 21st century, the US had amassed so much of power and such unprecedented levels of global reach, that it was already referred to be the undisputed ‘colossus’ for the next several decades. Yet, at the very beginning of the dawn, a globally active non-state actor – Al Qaida – proved how vulnerable America could be.
The debate about the nature and likely future direction of American power has, in recent times, preoccupied the minds of scholars. While some have compared and contrasted current American power with the imperial powers in the past and come to near conclusions about the superiority of the former in many respects, others have argued that such massive accumulation of power in one country could lead to unbridled brazenness directly or indirectly on the global community and could even lead to serious internal vacuum, implications of which could be disastrous for both the US and the world at large.
Is the US a real Empire? If so, what are its broad features? Does the US behave like an Empire? If so, what are the evidences and resultant implications of such behaviour? Is the world with such an Empire desirable or will the world be better off without it? These are some of the many fundamental questions that scholars and thinkers have been contemplating for quite some time. The quest to find reasonable answers to such trivial queries seems insatiable. Yet, recent scholarship has tried to offer some tentative explanations as well as a few suggestive pointers to such questions. As the complex universe of ‘Empire Project’ blends both subjective and objective determinants, a review of even a few critical studies becomes all the more important.
An attempt has been made here to review four significant works on aspects of Imperial power and more specifically of the power of the US. All four scholars are well known in their fields of activity. Niall Ferguson is currently a Professor of International History at Harvard University and has at least a dozen well acclaimed books to his credit, most of which display precisely distilled arguments based on important historical evidences. Professor Ferguson’s latest book, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, examines the pros and cons of American imperialism. Deepak Lal is the James S. Coleman Professor of International Studies at the UCLA. As a seasoned development economist with long years of advisory experience with many international agencies as well as various governments, his book, In Praise of Empire: Globalisation and Order explores the twin themes of empires and globalisation and discusses the place of the US in the current global order. Professor Joseph S. Nye Jr. serves as the Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He, like the previous two, needs no introduction. His book, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Super Power Can’t Go It Alone, argues that ‘hard power’ must be blended with ‘soft power’ for a super power like the US to advance and realize its national interests. G. John Ikenberry is Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University. Professor Ikenberry’s scholastic work, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars applies institutional theory of order formation and examines the problem of order in a global context and more importantly, the role of the US in it after the Cold War, especially in the later part of his book.
II – The Grand US Empire Project
The US today is in many ways like an Imperial power. It is vastly wealthy. The might of its wealth is self-evident. It is militarily peerless, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Half a trillion dollar devoted to military efforts by the US in 2004-05 says it all. It has a huge cultural reach. Its reach is evident from the fact that even the farthest corner of or the smallest state in the world at least subconsciously thinks about it while taking any major decision. In a span of just four years, Americans have intervened militarily against three states in the Balkans, Southern Asia, and the Middle East. As both Ferguson and Nye Jr. argue that whatever the rationale, each US incursion has led to a change of political regime, military occupation, and an attempt at institutional transformation euphemistically described as nation-building. Yet by comparison with other empires, it often struggles to impose its will beyond its shores. Reasons for this are many. Its successes in exporting American institutions and values to foreign lands have been outnumbered by its utter failures.
In many respects, this American predominance shares the same aspirations and ambitions as the last British Empire. Despite originating in a revolt against British imperialism, the US inherited many of its begetter’s defining characteristics. Styling itself as an “empire of liberty,” the fledgling Republic embarked on an astonishingly rapid colonisation of the central belt of the North American continent. If anything, the independent Americans expropriated indigenous peoples even more ruthlessly than they had as British subjects. However, as Ferguson argues, the differences between the British and American empires became more apparent as the US sought to extend its influence overseas. Its experiment with overt imperialism after 1898 had distinctly mixed results, ending unhappily in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, with the notable exceptions of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. The grand American project of ‘expanding liberty’ is continuing till date. If President Bush’s speech to the Republican Party Convention, spelt out in the New York Times on September 2, 2004 and myriads of many such avowals convey anything, it is “the story of America is the story of expanding liberty”. Putting in noble terms, “merica is not an Imperial Power”, yet crudely put, “it is a liberating power”, both Ferguson and Nye Jr. suggest that the differences in the meaning are starkly distinctive – the notion of expanding liberty is almost equated to Uncle Sam’s tyranny on the vanquished.
The US has invaded and occupied many countries over the past two centuries. Yet in terms of their economic and political institutions, relatively few of these have evolved into anything remotely resembling miniature Americas or even shown to have followed the basics of democracy. Will things go any better in Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq? And can President Bush live up to his implied threats to deal sooner or later with the other members of the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea – to say nothing of Cuba, Libya, and Syria, which were added to the list of ‘rogue states’ in May 2002, or Burma and Zimbabwe, also singled out for presidential opprobrium in November 2003? At the moment, simply imposing order in Iraq is proving difficult enough, even with British and Polish assistance. The Grand American ‘roadmap’ after years of noble efforts still seems like a chimera.
The half-hearted and at times foolhardy adventures at several places seem to exemplify the limits of American power. But how does one explain these limits? Ferguson, Nye Jr. and Ikenberry have explored these limits at length in their respective works. By most conventional measures of power— economic, military, and cultural—there has never been an empire mightier than the US today. Its recent difficulties in achieving its foreign policy goals cannot simply be blamed on the Bush Administration’s alleged diplomatic ineptitude, as argued by Lal. Rather, one needs fundamentally to rethink what one means by power. Often the very concept gets confused with that of other quite different things—wealth, weaponry, and a winning way with “soft power.” It is, in fact, perfectly possible to have a great deal of all these things, yet to have only limited power.
At least three fundamental deficits together explain why the US has been a less effective imperial power than its British predecessor. Ferguson says that they are its economic deficit, its manpower deficit, and – the most serious of the three – its attention deficit. The US has gone from being a net international creditor to being the world’s biggest debtor: its net international liabilities are now equivalent to around a quarter of its gross domestic product. America’s reliance on foreign capital is a balancing act on a very high wire. One plausible and troubling scenario is that foreign expectations could shift, leading to simultaneous pressure on the exchange rate and bond prices, with higher yields threatening American growth via mortgage rates and the housing market. But then, if Dick Cheney’s explanation, “Reagan proved that deficits do not matter”, is taken seriously, then something somewhere is definitely wrong in Uncle Sam’s thinking. Equally troubling is America’s manpower deficit. There is undoubtedly something perplexing about the apparent shortage of American combateffective troops at a time when the American prison population exceeds 2 million – 14 times the number of American troops in Iraq. Of the three deficits, however, it is the third that may prove the most difficult to overcome – namely, the attention deficit that seems to be inherent in the American political system and that already threatens to call a premature halt to reconstruction in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not intended as a term of abuse. The problem is systemic; it is the way the political process militates against farsighted leadership. Perhaps going back to understand the basics of ‘power’ and ‘morality’ and institutionalising both, could offer some help, as suggested by Ikenberry.
Does imperial denial matter? Ferguson argues that it does. Successful empire is seldom solely based on coercion; there must be some economic dividends for the ruled as well as the rulers, if only to buy the loyalty of local elites, and these dividends need to be sustained for a significant length of time. The trouble with an empire in denial, as argued by Ferguson, is that it tends to make two mistakes when it chooses to intervene in the affairs of lesser states. The first may be to allocate insufficient resources to the non-military aspects of the project. The second, and the more serious, is to attempt economic and political transformation in an unrealistically short time frame. At the moment, the US would seem to be making these mistakes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These two points help explain why this vastly powerful economy, with its extraordinary military capability, has had such a disappointing record when it has sought to bring about changes of political regime abroad.
III – Strategic Retreat or Engagement in a Global Village
Traditional, non-traditional or transnational threats such as war, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and organised crime – to say nothing of disease pandemics, climate change, and water shortages – put a premium on cooperation, not competition, between states. Lal and Ferguson have dealt with these at length. The attractions of unilateralism are undeniable, since demanding allies can be more irksome than invisible foes, but a solo strategy offers little prospect of victory against any of these challenges; the successful prosecution of the “wars” against all of them depends as much on multilateral institutions as does the continuation of international free trade, as argued by all the authors. A great empire cannot live in splendid isolation. The isolationist strategy that the US followed during the initial phase of its civilization does not seem viable in today’s international conditions. In fact, American success after both the Second World War and the Cold War was closely linked to the creation, nurturing and extension of international institutions that at once limited and yet legitimised American power. The Kansas farmer’s observation, “I think we are trying to run the business of the world too much” is fine but its broad contours, if weaved into the mainstream thinking, could certainly spell disaster both for the US and others. On the other hand, a judicious combination of realist and liberal-institutional traditions forming the core of American grand strategy could well be contemplated by the American scholarship.
All empires devote a large chunk of financial resources for both internal and external stability. Without hefty investment in enforcing the rule of law, countries like Afghanistan and Iraq will stagnate and perhaps disintegrate. More importantly, nation-building with democratic values at the core is always a long arduous road that needs not only long-term involvement but also periodic assessment, as argued by Ikenberry and Lal. Afghanistan and Iraq being two important test cases for the grand American democracy project have thus far shown very little signs of assimilating alien ideas. Unless the US is prepared to radically alter its attitudes towards low-intensity conflict, it will have little option but to cooperate with the more generous Europeans. Unilateralism, like isolation, is not so splendid after all. Indeed, it is seldom a realistic option for an empire. The danger is that great-power cooperation could simply break down, not because of rivalry between the US and the European Union but because both lack the will to act beyond their own borders. The internal problems of these huge and complex entities may simply distract them from the problems of failed states and rogue regimes. In brief, as Nye Jr. argues, empires do desire to have complete control over the areas they dominate but seldom do they care to at least understand the nuances of long historical and local culture of their subjects. The distinctly modern ideas that flow from them rarely transform, although impinging in some segments, the local culture. The dual process of cultural imposition from outside power and the consequent process of assimilation within the society takes many a decade.
The paradox of globalisation is that, as the world becomes more integrated, so power becomes more diffuse. As Lal and Nye Jr. suggest, thanks to the dynamism of international capitalism, all but the poorest people in the world have significantly more purchasing power than their grandfathers dared dream of. The means of production were never more productive or – as China and India achieve their belated economic takeoffs – more widely shared. Thanks to the spread of democracy, a majority of people in the world now have markedly more political power. The democratic means of election were never more widely accepted as the optimal form of government. The means of education too are accessible in most countries to much larger shares of the population than was the case two or three generations ago; more people than ever can harness their own brainpower. All these changes mean that the old monopolies on which power was traditionally based—monopolies on wealth, political office, and knowledge—have in large measure been broken up. Unfortunately, thanks to the proliferation of modern means of destruction, the power to inflict violence has also become more unevenly diffused.
IV – Emperor’s Liberal Dilemma
Critics of the great empires in general and the American imperial power in particular have singled out almost all the problems associated with imperialism, many of which have been expressed in the works of Ikenberry and Nye Jr. The list is endless as well as often so subjectively intertwined that even the imperial power itself becomes clueless about its duties. Take, for example, the case of exporting democratic values of an imperial power beyond its shores. Exporting democracy is a classic case of imperial dilemma. It has had success in the cases of Germany and Japan, yet its failure cases are too numerous to mention here. More than the willingness of the exporter, it is the willingness of the importer, the degree of which roughly weighs the success or failure of such projects. Would Iraq and Afghanistan, having long historical aversion to democratic traditions be prepared to embrace democracy? The answer seems as philosophically confusing as the query itself. What then does the imperial power do? Should it stop exporting democratic values, which as a desirable concept needs diffusion especially in the traditional societies? If so, how to undertake such difficult projects and taste success? Both the case for promotion of democracy and that too by an imperial power invariably invite criticism for obvious reasons.
Ferguson says that the world needs an effective liberal empire and that the US is the best candidate for the job. Economic globalisation is working. The rapid growth of per capita incomes in the world’s two most populous countries, China and India, means that international inequality is finally narrowing. But there are parts of the world where legal and political institutions are in a condition of such collapse or corruption that their inhabitants are effectively cut off from any hope of prosperity. And there are states that, through either weakness or malice, encourage terrorist organisations committed to wrecking a liberal world order. The number of such states, despite best efforts, is indeed increasing.
The US has good reasons to play the role of liberal empire, both from the point of view of its own security and out of straightforward altruism. In many ways too it is uniquely well equipped to play it, as observed by Ferguson. Yet for all its colossal economic, military, and cultural power, the US still looks unlikely to be an effective liberal empire without some profound changes in its economic structure, its social makeup, and its political culture. Most importantly, as Ikenberry and Nye Jr. suggest, all Americans should ask themselves whether they themselves are willing to change at least in the mental and socio-spiritual realms in order to gain more legitimacy from the societies that they wish to transform? Whatever they choose to call their position in the world – hegemony, primacy, predominance, or leadership – Americans should recognise the functional resemblance between Anglophone power present and past and should try to do a better rather than a worse job of policing an unruly world than their British predecessors. In learning from the history of other empires, Americans will learn not arrogance but precisely that humility which, as a candidate for the presidency, George W. Bush once recommended to his countrymen. And finally, the question Americans must ask themselves is just how transient they wish their predominance to be. Although the barbarians have already knocked at the gates and even threatened to inflict the worst damage, relative imperial endurance or decline seems more likely to come from within than without.
The breakthrough achieved on September 19 at the six-party (US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia and Japan) talks in Beijing has the potential to satisfactorily resolve the North Korean nuclear imbroglio that has been festering since 2002 when Pyongyang unilaterally withdrew from the international agreements that it had entered into over its domestic nuclear programme.
In the intervening three years, North Korea had been identified as part of the 'axis of evil' and the Bush administration has held a series of talks under the six party banner – in vain – till the breakthrough of September 19.
Paradoxically, this encouraging development has come about at a time when the major nuclear powers are grappling with the Iranian nuclear issue and the perceived violations of treaty commitments by Tehran – an issue that is now being deliberated upon at the IAEA in Vienna.
At the heart of both the issues lies the purported clandestine nuclear weapon programme being pursued by North Korea and Iran – which is a transgression of their non-nuclear weapon status as per the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that both states had voluntarily entered into.
North Korea had withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003 – which is legally permissible – since it believed that its supreme national interest was being threatened by what it has often described as US hegemony in the region. Intelligence reports have referred to Pyongyang seeking to extract weapon grade fissile material from the spent fuel in its nuclear reactors and inspections by the IAEA have been suspended by North Korea which has taken recourse to self-imposed isolation.
In the interim, Pyongyang had also declared that it has acquired nuclear weapons and this exigency can have tectonic implications in the tenuously maintained strategic balance of North East Asia with the possibility of Japan deciding to break its nuclear taboo – which would have a cascading effect in terms of the reaction from Beijing and Seoul.
The nuclear issue itself has become more animated since 9/11 and the US determination about Iraq and its quest for weapons of mass destruction. Hence the urgent import accorded to North Korea and innumerable talks over the last three years have finally led to the current breakthrough – though it needs to be reiterated that these are a set of principles that have to be implemented by all concerned.
This is not the first time that such a modus vivendi has been attempted and the Clinton administration tried in all sincerity – but failed with its energy cum security package.
It may be premature to conclude that the North Korean issue has been resolved in a permanent manner and that NE Asia will finally find its own strategic equipoise. What have been agreed to are a set of principles and the phased manner of the implementation includes assuaging of the security anxieties of all the interlocutors – principally North Korea, US and Japan – and at a remove South Korea.
In turn, North Korea will be offered an energy package enabled by South Korea and the culmination will be a verifiable dismantling of Pyongyang's nuclear weapon programme – and its final re-entry into the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Past experience would suggest that there can be mini obstacles and major hurdles to cross before the September 19 agreement is seen as a done deed. Certain differences have already cropped up over the light water reactors to be provided to North Korea and more banana peels will surface when the US Congress deals with the matter.
However, what emerges from the North Korean success is the increasing relevance of China in playing the role of an effective peace-broker in matters nuclear. China's role in tacitly enabling North Korea in its nuclear-missile programmes is one of the more complex post-Cold war challenges and it is evident that Beijing is now demonstrating its ability to play the role of a 'responsible' power when it so desires. From the sequence of meetings held with North Korea over the last three years, one may infer that the US and its allies, including Russia, were not in a position to prevail upon Pyongyang – and Beijing's intervention was necessary. The related extrapolation is that just as China's economic and trade relevance is now acknowledged within the region – and beyond – its strategic footprint is also being enhanced in a calibrated manner.
With North Korea moving towards a putative, consensual resolution, global attention will now shift to Iran, which is of more immediate and proximate relevance to India. Unlike the North Korean case, there are many divergences as far as Iran is concerned. While being an NPT signatory as a non-nuclear weapon state, Tehran has never claimed that it is seeking nuclear weapons or threatened to leave the NPT fold - actions that Pyongyang took. Most intelligence estimates suggest that Iran has been pursuing a covert programme for about 15 years as regards enrichment that goes beyond the rubric of peaceful use of nuclear energy and Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf recently admitted that the AQ Khan network had indeed enabled Iran in its covert nuclear programme.
Thus there is a great deal of opacity about the Iranian nuclear profile and Tehran has refused to accept greater intrusive inspections in its domestic nuclear facilities. Consequently, the global community led by the US is seeking to have the matter referred to the UN Security Council for a more robust and muscular response to contain nuclear proliferation and the matter is still being deliberated upon within the IAEA. Interestingly, while the US and the EU states have taken a certain position apropos the Iranian nuclear programme and Russia is veering around to the same, China has been very circ*mspect – till now. Whether China will enable Iran to acquire rudimentary nuclear weapon capability or join the other declared nuclear weapon powers in persuading Tehran to emulate Pyongyang will perhaps be the swing factor in the Iranian impasse. The deeper contestation is one between the US and China about whose influence will prevail in the volatile southern Asian region, which, apart from its hydrocarbon index, is emerging as the new theatre of strategic relevance. It is currently animated by the triad of critical global determinants – namely terrorism and religious radicalism, nuclear proliferation and energy stability. India is still a tangential player in these deliberations but it will have to monitor them with the utmost care. North Korea may yet be the lull before a still brewing tempest.
June 2, 2005 will go down as a red lettered day in the history of Maldives. On this day, the Maldivian parliament voted to allow multi-party democracy for the first time in the tiny atoll nation that has been ruled by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom since 1978. The parliament unanimously approved a resolution to allow political parties to seek recognition and contest elections, ending the no-party system in the nation. The motion was moved on the basis of a request from President Gayoom to review its earlier decision not to allow political parties in the country. The main opposition Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) termed this to be a revolution and stated that they looked forward to an exciting political future. However, the passing of the resolution was not without its own attendant drama. On the morning of the parliamentary debate, the authorities arrested four key dissidents on allegations of plotting to disrupt the proceedings in Parliament, raising fears that the government may scuttle the proposed reforms again. The four were released immediately after the vote.
The fact that the government allowed Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) leader Mohamed Nasheed – popularly called as Anni – to return to Male on April 30 had indicated the government’s commitment to the establishment of multiparty democracy. Though the government had vacillated in the past on the question of democratic reforms, it soon realised that the establishment of multiparty democracy was an idea whose time had come. For its part, the MDP has been quick to claim credit for the development and stated that it was due to its pressure that the resolution was passed. Earlier in May President Gayoom, when he arrived for a meeting at the United Nations Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, was confronted by protesters including volunteers from ‘Friends of Maldives,’ a group based in Salisbury. The protestors shouted slogans about the need for improved human rights and an end to torture and political oppression in the Maldives.
The past two years have been tumultuous; political dissent has been building up and often found expression in sudden bursts of violence. 2004 was an especially landmark year for the Maldives. The smallest state of South Asia was not only hit by tsunami that derailed the fastest growing economy in the region, but it also faced many political tremors. Political dissent, which had surfaced in late 2003, continued to change the political landscape. In the face of protests from the opposition, President Gayoom declared a state of emergency in August 2004, arresting many pro-democracy activists and using tear gas to disperse thousands of protesters who rallied in a rare show of dissent in the capital Male, which houses approximately one third of the island nation’s population. The tsunami that struck Maldives diffused to some extent the animus that had been generated between the supporters and opponents of President Gayoom. The elections that took place on January 2005, clearly demonstrated that a significant section of society was opposed to the policies of the government and was clamouring for a multiparty democracy. Faced with international pressure and demands from dissidents in exile, President Gayoom promised democratic reforms after these elections. It would however be useful to recollect the salient developments that took place in the nation during the last two years, which ultimately led to the introduction of multiparty elections.
The democracy movement in Maldives has its genesis in the events of September 2003 when the death of a detainee in Maafushi Island prison provoked rioting, which was brutally suppressed by the security forces resulting in the death of three more inmates. Consequent unrest led to widespread protests against the government in the capital, the first ever during President Gayoom’s tenure of over 25 years. A number of government buildings were attacked. Large numbers of demonstrators were arrested and an investigation was ordered into the deaths of the prisoners. The police commissioner and the Deputy Head of the National security Service (NSS), Brigadier Adam Zahir, was removed.
President Gayoom was re-elected by the Majlis for a sixth five-year term in September 2003 and was ratified in a national referendum receiving 90.3 per cent of the votes. In November 2003 President Gayoom dismissed from cabinet the Attorney General Dr Mohamed Munavvar and the Minister of Planning and National Development Ibrahim Hussain Zaki. The two were allegedly removed for supporting reformers attempting to register a political party. In November 2003 MDP, which had been prevented from registering as a political party in Maldives, was established abroad by London and Colombo based dissidents. Some clerics also extended support to this group. In February, 2004 activists of MDP were arrested in Male to prevent a planned march by opposition activists.
Elections were held in May 2004 for a People’s Special Majlis (constitutional assembly) with the purpose of amending the constitution. Voters chose 42 members out of 120 independent candidates, as political parties are not recognised. The President nominated another eight members to the council. The People’s Special Majlis also included members of the People’s Majlis and the Council of Ministers. In early June President Gayoom announced his agenda for constitutional reforms, which would allow political parties, limiting the term of the President to two five-year tenures, more powers for the Parliament, creating the post of Prime Minister and separating the judiciary, legislature and executive. He also suggested that women should be allowed to stand for the presidency and agreed to renounce the right to appoint eight members of the People’s Majlis. The People’s Special Majlis, which was sworn in on 15 June and convened on 19 July, was immediately suspended as 24 members walked out and raised anti government slogans. The dissidents continued to carry out protest marches and meetings unchallenged till early August 2004.
On August 11, 2004, a Wahabi cleric Farid was arrested on charges of unauthorised preaching. Some of his supporters followed him from the court to the NSS headquarters. MDP leaders and Islamic fundamentalists soon joined them, and together they organized a vigil outside the NSS headquarters for the release of the political prisoners. Despite repeated appeals to disperse, the crowd continued to swell and speeches became more anti-government. By the night of August 12, 2004, the crowd had soared to about 4000, which is more than five per cent of the population of Male and had started demanding removal of hardliner ministers and the resignation of the President. It is alleged by the government that some clerics at the meeting called the tourist resorts as unIslamic and demanded their closure. The attempt by the crowd to storm the NSS headquarters led to the stabbing of some policemen and the arrest of 200 anti government activists. The Government termed the demonstrations as a ‘coup attempt’ and imposed an indefinite state of emergency on August 13, 2004. Armoured Personnel Carriers were deployed and telephone and Internet services were temporarily suspended. The opposition MDP accused the government of ‘ruthlessly suppressing dissent’. An EU fact finding team invited by the President expressed concern about the continuing detention without charges of the alleged protestors and the ongoing state of emergency. By early September most people had been released while about 60 continued in detention, which included the former Attorny-General Dr Mohamed Munavvar and some members of the People’s Special Majlis. On September 1, 2004 amidst international criticism for suppression of the August demonstrations, President Gayoom relinquished the Defence and Finance portfolios.
In December 2004, Gayoom’s government charged four dissidents — including former planning minister Ibrahim Zaki — with coup for attempting to overthrow the president. A conviction could mean a life sentence for all four accused. The Majlis elections scheduled on non-party basis were postponed initially to December 2004 and when the tsunami hit the islands to January 22, 2005. The special Majlis, which had been tasked to develop a new constitution, has virtually remained in suspended animation since its inauguration on July 19, 2004.
In the January elections held on non-party basis, 70 per cent of the 156,766 eligible voters cast their votes. All the 20 atolls and the capital Male elected two legislators each. MDP claimed that it won 18 of the 42 seats, with pro-government candidates winning 22 and independents two. But the government claims that at least 30 candidates are pro-government, and only eight are pro-MDP. The figures cannot be reconciled because all candidates officially ran as independents, although most voters know their political leanings. The election of a large number of opposition candidates especially from Male has increased the pressure on President Gayoom. The fact that the opposition members represent the constituencies with most number of electorates and in terms of electorates represented the combined opposition members probably represent more electorates than the government members, put the President in a tight spot.
In the past, reforms and the promised transition to multiparty democracy had progressed slowly in fits and starts. As the existing political system favours the status quo, the opposition had tried to depict President Gayoom as a despot, who was not willing change lest he loses power. But with the passage of the parliamentary resolution clearing the way for multiparty democracy, he has proved them wrong. Three political parties including the ruling party have been accorded the pre-registration status and are expected to be recognized as political parties by end August. The parties are the MDP led by Mohamed Nasheed, Maldives Peoples Party of Gayoom supporters and Islamic Democratic Party (IDP) led by former police sergeant Umar Naseer. By clearing the way for multiparty democracy, Gayoom has shown that he was always committed to reforms and the establishment of multiparty democracy was now an irreversible process. He has stated that he expected the reform process to be completed this year so that the country could begin 2006 with a new constitution.
A series of 434 bomb blasts that rocked as many as 60 of 64 districts in Bangladesh on August 17 may have been 'mild' by way of the number killed – just two people – but the symbolism is very significant and perhaps inversely proportional to the damage caused.
Leaflets recovered from some of the blast sites demanded that the country become more Islamic and the needle of suspicion points to the banned Islamic group, the Jamaat-ul- Mujahedin. And while investigations are continuing, the implications of this incident are of potentially grave import.
All the blasts were synchronised to take place within 30 minutes of each other and the targets in most cases were symbols of the state – government buildings, local courts and revenue offices. The fact that such detailed co-ordination could be effected in a largely rural country with poor infrastructure and communication links may point to two inferences. One, that the mobile phone has empowered Bangladesh in an unintended manner and two, that there was a colossal failure of intelligence or – worse still – that there was some collusion from within the security apparatus of the state.
Either exigency is cause for deep concern since it was expected that there would be some disturbances in this period given the fact that the 30th anniversary of the assassination of the late Mujibur Rehman – the founder of Bangladesh – was being observed on August 15. The moot question is whether the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) government headed by Begum Khaleda Zia is unwilling or unable to deal with the scourge of religious radicalism and related extremism, or are some elements within the government tacitly allowing such organised violence?
The August 17 incident was preceded by a rash of attacks with religious right-wing overtones leavened by the deep chasm that permeates political discourse in Bangladesh with the two major parties-the BNP and the AL (Awami League)-being deeply divided over a host of issues.
It may be recalled that on August 21 last year, an AL rally was subjected to grenade attacks that killed 21 people, including senior political leader Ivy Rahman, and it was fortuitous that more members of the party were not among the casualties.
Liberal opinion in Bangladesh is anguished over these twin trends. The first is the inflexible mutual hostility that the two major parties have maintained, wherein every major issue is polarised along party lines; and the second is the growing nexus between religious right wing groups and the ruling party. The AL lost the 2001 election to the BNP which had aligned itself with the Jamaat and the Islamic Oikya Jote (Islamic Unity Council).
The Islamic Oikya Joten (IOJ) established in 1990 comprises seven parties: Khelafat Majlis, Nezam-e-Islam, Faraizi Jamaat, Islami Morcha, Ulama Committee, a splinter group of National Awami Party (Bhasani), and Islami Shashantantra Andolo. Its main aim is reportedly to establish an Islamic polity based upon Islamic jurisprudence and the Khilafat. Over the years, the BNP partners have used the message of divisive and sectarian Islam to mobilise the rural populace in the villages of the country, thereby shrinking the vote bank of the more moderate AL. The Jamaat and the IOJ together obtained 20 seats out of 300 in the 2001 general elections and are now an assertive part of the BNP-led ruling coalition in Dhaka.
According to local reports, the Jamaat's rallying slogan is 'amra hawbo Bangladesh, Bangla hobay Afghan' - meaning 'we will become Taliban, Bangladesh will become Afghanistan'.
Many Islamic states have witnessed a gradual increase in the ascendancy of religious parties in their domestic polities and Bangladesh is no exception. Since the early 1990s, there has been a supra-national ideological motivation for right wing Islamic religiosity and the emergence of an international Islamic front espousing a rigid Wahabi strain of Islam and supported by funds from Saudi Arabia and other states has incrementally became part of the global canvas.
The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s with the al-Qaida at the core is the more visible manifestation of this trend. In South Asia, this pattern received further impetus from the military establishment in Pakistan and, given the deep linkages between the Pakistani ISI and the right wing groups in Bangladesh – particularly the Jammat-e- Islami (which incidentally supported Pakistan in 1971 during the war for the liberation of Bangladesh), these parties became more effective and spawned militant splinter groups.
The greater irony is that the government in Dhaka has been steadfastly refusing to acknowledge that such groups exist in Bangladesh and has preferred to do the ostrich act despite evidence to the contrary that has been presented by various intelligence agencies, including those from the US and UK among others. In a candid comment, Bangladesh's leading newspaper, the Daily Star, observed editorially (August 21) of the spate of terrorist attacks: "The one benefit to come out of the unspeakable tragedy was supposed to be that it rammed home the fact that there are dangerous extremists in our midst and that the government needed to take serious action to safeguard the nation."
Left unchecked, this trend of growing radicalism in Bangladesh leading to motivated violence can result in a very destabilising situation wherein the electoral process can be hijacked to suit the interests of the right-wing religious extremists.
This would be very undesirable for the region as a whole and enlightened moderation is urgently called for in the internal discourses of Bangladesh. The argumentative characteristic that noted economist Amartaya Sen has examined in some detail in the Indian context had its greatest exponents in Bengali tradition and now more than ever, the liberal spectrum in Bangladesh will have to determinedly debate over which fork in the post 9-11 road their country will take.
August 17 should serve as both wake-up call and a much needed inoculation.
